Over the past several years, I have been reflecting on the Arab Spring from the perspective of the international community’s response, its implications for international security, and the violent nature of most of the transition processes. These posts have become more broadly focused on the Middle East and (North) Africa and more irregular as time has passed…
Military action, limited or otherwise, is not the answer to the much more fundamental problems that the region faces and poses. It is likely not even part of that answer. The quicker we move beyond the narrow debate over military responses to a more comprehensive strategy, the better for Syria, the Arab Spring, and ultimately for us.
Within the countries of the Arab Spring, the forces unleashed by the sudden opening of political spaces were largely inexperienced, remain fearful and intolerant of each other, and were easily manipulated in regional and global proxy conflicts.
The key challenge for the rival factions in Egypt is to learn the right lessons from its so-far disastrous post-Mubarak transition and find the courage to right the wrongs committed by both sides.
The key challenge for the rival factions in Egypt is to learn the right lessons from its so-far disastrous post-Mubarak transition and find the courage to right the wrongs committed by both sides.
Western powers can and must play a key role in containing the threat posed by al-Qaeda, if only to to create the space in which local political, religious, civic, and business leaders can eradicate the fertile ground of regime illegitimacy from which al-Qaeda will otherwise, more likely than not, rise and rise again.
Military coups are not a means of democratic politics, but democratic politics in societies as deeply divided as Egypt may not be possible with the kind of exclusive institutions and uncompromising political leaders that the country currently has. Temporarily suspending the constitution is a stop-gap measure that can work in the short-term. What Egypt may also need in the long-term is a more inclusive set of political institutions and leaders that put the interests of the country as a whole above their own.
The White House announced that the US would start providing military aid to some of the rebel groups, but it remains unclear whether arming rebel groups in Syria will contribute to achieving the stated aims of US and UK policy: to save lives, to pressure the Assad regime to negotiate seriously, and to prevent the growth of extremism and terrorism.
The use of drones from Gaza to Waziristan, from Helmand to Abyan and to Gedo, thus, has important implications for international security in two dimensions: the possibilities of managing intrastate conflict and the relationship between the intervening and the target state.
Three ‘ingredients’ are essential in managing processes such as the Arab Spring and their aftermath successfully: leadership, diplomacy, and institutional design.
Despite limited engagement so far, the EU’s “skill set” may yet come to be in demand in Libya. If it does, it will be required for the long term.
The National Dialogue in Yemen is an attractive concept to frame many of the difficult challenges that lie ahead of Yemen but there are also some significant challenges related to it.
The post-election national dialogue in Yemen faces a multitude of serious challenges and there is a wide range of potential spoilers inside and outside the country, but it is Yemen’s perhaps only chance at negotiating a transition.
The key priorities for domestic and international crisis management in Yemen must be to work with all political forces in Yemen to prevent an outbreak of major violence as they compete for power and influence in the country, to contain and delimit the threat of AQAP, and to initiate a process of economic stabilisation and recovery.