

## Chapter 1

# The European Union as a Global Conflict Manager: Capabilities and Context in an Interdependent World

*Stefan Wolff and Richard G. Whitman*

### [A] Introduction

The aim of preserving peace, preventing conflicts from erupting into violence and strengthening international security is an important element of the external action of the European Union as laid down in the Lisbon Treaty. Violent conflicts cost lives, cause human rights abuses, displace people, disrupt livelihoods, set back economic development, exacerbate state fragility, weaken governance and undermine national and regional security. Preventing conflicts and relapses into conflict, in accordance with international law, is therefore a primary objective of the EU's external action, in which it could take a leading role acting in conjunction with its global, regional, national and local partners. (Union 2011)

This bold declaration is the European Union's (EU) latest and most aspirational pronouncement of its intent to play a greater role as an international security actor and bring to bear the whole range of its capabilities for conflict management. The

Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention, from which it is taken, reflect well the broader aspirations that the EU has in this area and how far it has come in developing a more assertive vision for its role in international conflict management. That the Union would arrive at this stage was by no means a foregone conclusion. For more than a decade, the European Union's sole experience of managing intra-state conflict was in the Western Balkans, and it was an experience of mostly abject failure. Only in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century did it seem that the Union had learned the lessons of earlier mistakes: the decisive intervention in Macedonia in 2001, well-coordinated with NATO, has rightly been hailed a success. While the ride to stability and security in the Balkans post-2001 was clearly not without bumps in the road, the EU, for the most part, seemed to have gained sufficient control and self-confidence in managing conflicts in its immediate neighbourhood to give rise to a modicum of success. Yet, in February 2008 the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo catapulted the Western Balkans back to the centre stage of international security concerns. Despite affirmations to the contrary, the recognition of Kosovo's independence by major Western powers has been seen as a significant precedent in international law and the way in which similar conflicts are handled by the international community. At the same time, it has raised major questions for the stability of borders across the Western Balkans region and beyond, from the Caucasus to South and Southeast Asia, from Iraq to Somalia and Sudan. At the centre of many of these questions is the role of the international community—defined as international and regional organisations, as well as their powerful member states—in tackling the complexity of inter-related and often internationalised local conflicts, incomplete democratisation processes, growing concerns about the economic

viability of conflict-torn states (and their potential successors) and an ever increasing presence of transnational organised crime networks with significant reach beyond their country and region of origin.

Perhaps, this is nowhere more apparent at present than in relation to Arab Spring. From the more-or-less enthusiastic military intervention in Libya; to the reluctance of becoming drawn more deeply into the evolving conflict in Yemen; the wait-and-see policy in the case of Syria; and outright rejection of support for the pro-democracy movement in Bahrain; regional and international organisations, including the UN, the EU, and the AU, as well as their individual member states have offered anything but a coherent strategy on how to deal with the humanitarian and security challenges presented by the unrest that has engulfed large parts of the Middle East and North Africa since the end of 2010.

The international community, and the EU within it, has been here before. Take the example of the Western Balkans in the 1990s: finding a unified position on the recognition of the successor states of Socialist Yugoslavia proved a serious problem to the then European Community (EC) in the self-declared 'hour of Europe'. Preventing and containing the bloody disintegration of the country was a task too big for the combined might of the UN, NATO, OSCE, EC, and all their member states. Feeble political will in the face of local actors hell-bent on implementing self-serving ethnocentric political agendas allowed the conflict first to escalate and then to go on for three years with around 100,000 people killed in Bosnia alone and millions displaced across the region. Even though the reaction was more determined

and swifter in Kosovo in the late 1990s, it took three months of bombing and the credible threat of deploying ground troops before yet another crisis was contained—an example that does not bode well in the context of the evolving situation in Libya. As noted above, only in the case of Macedonia in 2001 is there a story to be told of a somewhat more successful prevention of violent conflict escalation. Yet, Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo remain inextricably linked as three cases in the Western Balkans that, despite superficial stability in the former two, and an apparent ‘solution’ of the latter, represent unresolved conflicts which all have significant potential to contribute to further regional instability. Similar, and similarly bleak, stories can be told of international (non-)interventions and their outcomes in the South Caucasus, in Africa (e.g., Somalia, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, etc.), the Middle East, Iraq, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Indonesia, and so on.

The apparent ineptitude of the international community to manage such conflicts effectively to one side, the management and prevention of conflict remains high on the agenda of many international organisations (IOs), which see this as one of their main security tasks. IOs have indeed become extensively involved in attempts at conflict management and prevention in, for example, the Balkans, Middle East and Africa. Moreover, calls for these organisations to increase their involvement in these areas are frequent. Despite all of this, however, our knowledge and understanding of the impact of IO (or, more generally, third-party) involvement in conflict management is still relatively limited. In particular, while there is considerable case-specific and anecdotal evidence, we lack conceptual frameworks and systematic comparative research on these issues. While offering one possible macro-framework

for the study of the EU (i.e., one particular regional organisation with global reach) as a global conflict manager, our approach is informed by two fundamental premises: (i) conflicts, while complex political phenomena, can be prevented and settled, and (ii) it is possible to understand different conflict management processes and to discover certain regularities in them that can help us understand the broader notion of conflict management and the role of international organisations, such as the EU, within them.

To be sure, conflict and conflict management are complex processes, but their complexity must not be confused with a difficulty, let alone impossibility, to understand. Rather, what it means is that there are lots of different things to understand. This understanding can be facilitated with the help of an analytical model that allows us to identify, categorise and group a wide range of different factors that are relevant for understanding the success and failure of conflict management efforts. In order to construct such a model, we proceed in several steps. First, we develop the 'shell' of our analytical model, drawing on an existing body of international relations literature where the so-called levels-of-analysis approach has been developed and used since the late 1950s. Second, we argue that, apart from these external factors which are beyond the full control of those who intervene to resolve a particular conflict, there are a number of factors internal to the intervening party that co-determine whether an intervention succeeds or fails. From this perspective, our interest is neither in the causes of conflict nor in the motivations of the EU (or other third parties) to intervene in particular cases of conflict.<sup>1</sup> Rather our interest is in the causes of success and failure of these interventions; that is, in the

(external) causes that facilitate or prevent conflict settlement and in the (internal) causes that facilitate or prevent the formulation and implementation of policies of successful intervention.

The development of the EU's activities as a conflict manager has taken place against the background of the development and elaboration of the notion of the comprehensive approach to security.<sup>2</sup> The development of the comprehensive approach has been a guiding idea central to international organisations and individual states in refining conceptions of security and how to manage their security needs. As we indicate in this volume, providing security across all dimensions is a fundamental ambition of the EU, yet at the same time essential to its success as a global security actor, not least in its role as a conflict manager. This presents a formidable challenge in coordinating a significant number of institutional actors and policy domains within the Union, both at the political-strategic level and at the level of planning and operations. From the point of analysts of the EU, capturing the practices of the Union as an actor seeking to engage in a comprehensive approach to security also poses considerable analytical difficulties, including in relation to accounting for success and failure. As we demonstrate in the remainder of this introductory chapter and throughout the contributions that follow, this requires an equally comprehensive analytical approach, and one that looks beyond the Union's own capabilities to the context of specific cases in which these are brought to bear.

Seeking to move to a comprehensive approach has had a considerable impact on how states and international organisations have approached the question of how to coordinate their military and civilian capabilities in ways that are efficient and effective, including in complex conflict management operations (Williams 2011). Conceptually the comprehensive approach intends to inform the organisation of the actors involved to work together from the planning stage to the implementation of activities. It is intended to harness the respective strengths of civilian and military actors in a manner that provides a joined-up approach to all phases of conflict from stabilisation to reconstruction. Consequently in assessing the EU's role in conflict management we are also offering an assessment of the extent to which it has successfully followed-through on its ambitions to be a comprehensive security provider.

### **[A] EU Conflict Management: A Conceptual and Empirical Clarification**

Studying the performance of the EU as a global conflict manager encounters, *prima facie*, a conceptual difficulty that relates to the very notion of conflict management itself. It is not a term frequently used in EU parlance, certainly when compared with the much more common concepts of conflict prevention and crisis management. These are both distinct notions in terms of both meaning and the policies attached to them. Conflict prevention implies long-term policies aimed at structural changes to eliminate root causes of conflict. Crisis management, in contrast, has a shorter timeframe and implies a degree of urgency and immediacy, aiming to stop escalation and/or deal with the consequences of a rapidly worsening situation. In this sense,

crisis management can also be seen as short-term prevention, with more limited objectives, such as preventing the spread or intensification of violence or emergency humanitarian assistance to refugees from an escalating conflict. In our view, conflict management subsumes these two sets of policies, but also covers a third, commonly referred to as conflict settlement or resolution, that is policies aimed at finding a compromise between the parties that will allow them to address remaining and/or future disputes between them by political or judicial means, rather than by recourse to violence. Such policies typically involve various forms of mediation. Compared to conflict prevention and crisis management, they are far less well-developed within the EU institutionally and far fewer actual examples of EU activities exist here.

In view of the different types of policies that we, thus, conceptualise to be part of EU conflict management, we define this term in the sense of long-term engagement with a particular country or region, an engagement that, over time, will necessitate different conflict management policies, including military crisis management, development and humanitarian aid efforts, and mediation between conflict parties. This is apparent from a number of the subsequent case studies in our volume which indicate that EU conflict management operations involve elements of all three policies, albeit to varying degrees. The Western Balkans, and especially the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia discussed by Peen Rodt and Wolff in Chapter 10, demonstrate this tendency most clearly. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Union was a key player in the early, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempts by the international community to mediate between the conflict parties; it was marginalised in the military operations that helped bring the conflict to an end; and it has played

an increasingly, and today dominant, role in the country's post-conflict reconstruction process, including with the deployment of a military and police mission. In Macedonia, alongside NATO, the Union was instrumental in mediating the Ohrid Framework Agreement that has formed the basis of political and institutional reform in the country, and much like in Bosnia and Herzegovina some years later, the EU took over a military mission from NATO and deployed a police mission. In Africa, as discussed by Gorm Rye Olsen in Chapter 5 with reference to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Darfur, long-term structural prevention in the form of development policy and short-term crisis management in the form of limited troop deployments went hand-in-hand.

In other cases, the EU's involvement in conflict management has been less comprehensive. Cyprus, as discussed by James Ker-Lindsay in Chapter 4, is a case that demonstrates the potential, however limited, of what is often seen as the EU's strongest leverage—accession—as a tool of conflict management. As Ker-Lindsay notes, the EU may not have had much direct involvement in the UN-facilitated negotiations process, but it is difficult to see how this process would have come about without the EU and its promise of membership. Such promise of membership, now a reality at least for the Greek part of Cyprus, is unique to this case and the Western Balkans.

Two other cases—Moldova and Georgia—fall somewhere between the cases with a clear accession perspective (Western Balkans) and those with clearly none (Africa, Afghanistan, and arguably the Israel/Palestine). In both Moldova and Georgia, the

EU had long been on the side lines of long-standing conflict management processes and had reluctantly accepted a role that would contribute to shaping an environment more conducive to the success of conflict settlement processes dominated by other players. Yet, as Whitman and Wolff argue in Chapter 7, the EU's management of the 2008 crisis of the Georgia-Russia war has been highly effective and the Union now plays a formal role in the Geneva (negotiations) process while having a military observer mission on the ground in Georgia. Importantly, the role the EU played in managing the 2008 crisis was preceded by almost two decades of prior engagement with Georgia, at least partially driven by conflict management 'desires'. In Moldova, the Union does not (yet) have a very prominent role in the negotiations to bring about a settlement of the Transnistria conflict, but, as Gordon shows in Chapter 9, the EU has clearly increased its investment in conflict management over time by bolstering the actual negotiation process and by emphasising political and economic reform in its engagement with Moldova.

This leaves Afghanistan and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict among our case studies. They are similar in the sense that, like Africa, they represent 'out-of-area' cases with no realistic accession perspective. Yet, in terms of impact, the differences are stark. As Siniver argues in Chapter 6, while the EU may theoretically be the most suited third party to mediate in the conflict, it is, despite massive financial commitments and the deployment of a border assistance mission and a police mission to the Palestinian territories, unlikely to be accepted as such unless the US turns its back on the region. In contrast, the case of Afghanistan demonstrates the significant impact that the EU is capable of in post-conflict reconstruction. As Gross illustrates in

Chapter 8, the EU's added value, while not always fully successful, is in strengthening Afghan institutions—in this sense, a long-term policy aimed at preventing renewed conflict.

The second difficulty arises from the very fact that conflict management as defined here involves a wide range of different EU policies and institutions with no single 'executor'. While more pronounced prior to the coming in force of the Lisbon Treaty, the very term *EU* conflict management is somewhat misleading, as different policies are the, often jealously guarded, prerogative of different institutions with their distinct competences, resources and decision-making procedures. The capacity of the EU to reconcile these different strands of the EU's conflict management activities is the focus of Gebhard in Chapter 2. As Gebhard illustrates synergy across EU institutional boundaries is important for the EU's overall performance as a global conflict manager and the EU's institutional nature has affected the progress of its development. Further, the Treaty of Lisbon has re-established, rather than eliminated, divides in the EU's conflict management activities. A clear example of this is the difference between the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) that is maintained: the former clearly inter-governmental and run by the Council, the latter attached to the Commission. Moreover, as Gebhard demonstrates, the CFSP (and the CSDP as Shepherd demonstrates in Chapter 3), in terms of resources at least, is much more dependent on cooperation with NATO (principally, under the 2002 Berlin+ arrangements). While ENP with its 'softer' policies is relative more independent. At the same time, however, there is clearly a more significant potential for real and meaningful policy

coordination in the post-Lisbon era as the joint launch of the ENP review (Commission 2011) on 25 May 2011 by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Commission Vice-President, Baroness Catherine Ashton, and the European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, Štefan Füle, indicates.

Further, an additional set of institutional actors and processes have emerged alongside the EU's CFSP and external relations in the last decade as the EU has developed a defence policy component. As Shepherd demonstrates in Chapter 3 this has been heavily shaped by the EU's developing conflict management aspirations and especially with the desire to combined military and civilian capabilities for crisis management. This combination of civilian and military capabilities has meant that CSDP, while being just one element of the CFSP, which is itself just one component of the EU's overall approach to conflict management, has quickly become fundamental to the EU's approach to conflict management. The civil-military potential of CSDP coupled with other instruments from CFSP and across the EU, has left the EU seeking to position itself, at least rhetorically, as a 'unique' and 'comprehensive' crisis manager.

A third difficulty is related to the notion of success. We cannot explain why the EU has or has not succeeded in particular conflict management exercises unless we establish the parameters of success. Peen Rodt's contribution in Chapter 13 on the EU's performance in military crisis management addresses this difficulty head-on in the context of her cases and develops a four-fold notion of success along the lines of

internal and external goal attainment and appropriateness. This is a useful framework for a broader definition of the success of EU conflict management as it highlights several aspects of the difficulties associated with the very notion of success. First among them is the fact that we need to judge the level of success against what a conflict management intervention of any kind—civilian and/or military, short-term and/or long-term—was meant to achieve in terms of the mandate that the EU drew up. In other words, did the Union achieve the goals that it set itself? This is clearly an important benchmark in that it allows us to examine the extent to which existing capabilities can produce desired outcomes. Yet, success in conflict management is not only third-party related, in fact, one might argue it is as much if not more about actual impact on the ground. In other words, the question is not only what outcomes the EU produced when implementing a particular conflict management operation but also about whether this operation actually had a positive impact on the conflict as a whole.

This distinction between outcomes and impact is not a merely academic exercise: as a number of our case studies demonstrate, in terms of its goals, the EU has hardly ever failed since its Balkan interventions in the early 1990s. Yet, this is partly due to a more realistic and cautious definition of mission mandates which no longer seek ‘peace’ but rather more limited goals such as, for example, those defined in relation to the EU missions in the DRC as examined by Olsen in Chapter 5. In other cases, goals are vague: supporting, or contributing to, conflict resolution processes—a standard phrase in the definition of tasks for most EU Special Representatives as noted by Adebahr in Chapter 11—is an outcome that would be difficult not to

achieve. However, assessing the role of the EU as a global conflict manager requires us to look further and ask whether these outcomes have actually produced any changes on the ground; in other words, has the EU's (passive) support or (active) contribution actually resulted in a conflict being resolved? It is in this dimension that the picture becomes more mixed and success in terms of, in Peen Rodt's terminology, internal goal attainment needs to be qualified in light of more limited impact on the ground in terms of the actual conflict.

Where does this conceptual exploration leave us? First, it leaves us with a significant, yet diverse number of cases that, in our definition of the term, qualify as instances of conflict management in which the EU has been involved over the past two decades. Second, it leaves us with a range of distinct policies, and institutions that carry them out, within the EU both of which individually and in relation to each other have undergone important changes over this period. Third, it leaves us with a nuanced definition of success that considers both what the EU has delivered in terms of the goals that it set itself and how much and what kind of impact its policies have had on the ground. Conversely, explaining varying levels of success, then, requires us to consider both EU capabilities and the specific context in which they were brought to bear. In other words, if success is 'measured' in relation to both mandate completion and actual impact, we cannot focus solely on factors that pertain either solely to the EU's existing (or lacking) capabilities or to factors that are specific to the conflict which the Union seeks to manage. Looking at both internal and external factors allows us to avoid 'EU-bashing' at the one extreme and absolving it from any responsibility on the other.

The challenge for us is now to develop a coherent analytical framework that allows us to bring together the study EU institutions, policies, and activity in the field and to explain why the EU in some cases is more successful than in others. We do so by first considering the current state of the field of the study of EU conflict management and then presenting our own approach that has guided the discussion in the chapters that follow this introduction.

### **[A] The Current State of the Field**

When it comes to the role of the EU as an international security actor, including its role as a conflict manager, much of the literature has, and remains to be, focused on the evolution of the EU's internal processes.<sup>3</sup> Close scrutiny of the development of institutions and policies, their interrelationships, the divergence and convergence of member states' preferences, etc., has long been a primary focus of studies in this area, not least because of a lack of real-world application: after all, ESDP, having been officially launched in 1999, only became fully operational in 2002. This literature, however, is naturally very useful in assessments of EU capabilities. For example, in a ten-year stock-take of ESDP Menon (2009) argues that while the EU has launched 22 military and civilian missions in the first decade of ESDP, these were all limited in size and scope, saying little about actual, especially military capabilities of the Union. While recognising the overall progress in developing military capability as significant if compared to the pre-1999 era, others are equally sceptical (Cornish and Edwards 2005; Blockmans and Wessel 2009). A similar assessment is frequently made in relation to civilian capabilities: Jakobsen (2006), for example, sees another

expectations-capability gap in this area. A third area of concern noticeable in the literature pertains to civil-military coordination (Bird 2007; Cornish and Edwards 2001, 2005; Youngs 2008) and is closely linked to inter-institutional failures of delivering a coordinated, coherent and consistent foreign security policy across the range of available instruments (Olsen 2008; Delcour 2010; Bagoyoko and Gibert 2009; Gourlay 2004) and to do so efficiently (Hardt 2009; Rieker 2009).

Coordination problems, however, are not only a problem of the EU's institutions. In fact, inter-institutional problems are, in part at least, a consequence of, often diverging, preferences and priorities of the member states. Much of the discussion here is centred on the 'big three' (Germany, France, UK) and their changing relationships with each other and the institutions in Brussels (Gegout 2009; Giegerich 2008; Gordon 2006; Gross 2007; Howorth 2003; Irondelle and Mérand 2010; Longhurst and Miskimmon 2007; Mérand et al. 2009; Wagnsson 2010; Ulriksen et al. 2004). Yet, not everything is dependent on the 'big three' alone. The serious difficulties that the EU has experienced in implementing its Battle Group Concept highlights the crucial role played by smaller member states in an area that remains dominated by intergovernmentalism (Chappell 2009; Jacoby and Jones 2008).<sup>4</sup> Intergovernmentalism, thus, is highly dependent on member states' perceptions of their own interests, including where to spend domestic resources and how to shape the allocation of equally finite EU resources (Youngs 2008) and how they prioritise their other international relationships, primarily with the United States, Russia, NATO, the UN, as well as other significant third-party actors on a case-by-case basis.

This latter area, raises a final capability issue for the EU: cooperation with partners in the implementation of its conflict management policies within an environment in which the EU itself challenges the existing nature of international organisation (Diez et al. 2011). All civilian and military operations undertaken by the EU to date have been carried out in cooperation with third parties. This is a reflection of both the complementary capabilities that such parties bring to an EU mission (or vice-versa) and of the EU's strong commitment to multilateral action in the international security arena, which in turn also shapes the nature of many EU operations and arguably their effectiveness. The literature correctly places as much emphasis on bilateral relations in the context of transatlantic links (Giegerich 2010; Howorth and Menon 2009; Posen 2006) and the EU-Russia relationship (Averre 2005, 2009; Piiparinen 2008; Wagnsson 2010; Wilson and Popescu 2009) as on inter-organisational relations, especially with NATO (Duke 2008; Mace 2004; Ulriksen et al. 2004), the UN (Charbonneau 2009), the OSCE (Stewart 2008) and the AU (Brosig 2010; Morsut 2009).

Especially in relation to EU cooperation with third parties, this literature has taken a significant turn towards studying the way in which the EU brings to bear its different capabilities to act (i.e., to apply existing policy instruments and deploy civilian and military missions), to provide funding in the short and long-term from EU-specific and member state sources, and to coordinate its internal decision-making processes and give them focus and coherence. The related capability to cooperate with third parties in concrete conflict management operations, thus provides a crucial link between an analysis focused on EU capabilities and one that examines context-

specific factors in relation to a particular conflict when seeking explanations for success or failure of particular conflict interventions. In so doing, part of the literature on EU conflict management recognises, on a case-by-case basis, the significance of the conflict context, albeit in varying degrees of systematisation and generalizability. On the one end of the spectrum, offering a relatively greater degree of systematisation and generalizability, Diez, Stetter and Albert (Diez et al. 2006), in their work on the impact of the EU on border conflicts identify a range of factors that determine EU impact in relation to this particular kind of international security challenge. A similarly broad, comparative approach can be found, among others, in the work of Coppieters (2004), Emerson (2004), Kronenberger and Wouters, (2004), Tocci (2005, 2007) and Whitman and Wolff (2010b). A mid-level of generalisation and systematisation in the literature is represented by studies that focus on particular regions, such as, for example Sasse's (2008, 2009) work on the former Soviet Union, Gordon's (2009) and Peen Rodt and Wolff's (Roldt and Wolff 2010) examination of the Western Balkans, and Olsen's (2002, 2008, 2009) and Gegout's (2009) studies of EU conflict management in Africa. Finally, there is a strand in the literature that offers insights into specific single cases of EU conflict management, including recent work by Knutsen (2009) on the Democratic Republic of Congo, by Ilievski and Taleski (2009) on Macedonia, by Sebastian (2009) on Bosnia and Herzegovina, by Tocci (2009) on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and by Yakinthou (2009) on Cyprus. While not easily generalizable beyond the specific case considered, these studies offer valuable case-specific analysis, as well as a broader 'endorsement' of the more general point that context matters in understanding success and failure of EU conflict management.


This more case-specific literature on EU conflict management thus begins to bring together different scholarship on international organisations, on international intervention, and on conflict management and offers comparative insights in relation to other international and regional organisations<sup>5</sup> or examines conflict management as part of other, broader EU policies, most recently and most significantly enlargement and ENP.<sup>6</sup>

Having thus examined the current state of the field in relation to the study of EU conflict management, what remains is to synthesise the different literatures discussed above into a single conceptual framework that can provide the analytical tools for the study of the EU as a global conflict manager. As we indicated earlier, this needs to incorporate an analysis of factors within the EU, or at least predominantly related to its capabilities, and of factors that are exogenous to the EU yet determine the nature and dynamics of the particular conflict situation the EU confronts. The next two sections of our introductory chapter will outline the main parameters of this framework that then guides the analysis in all subsequent contributions.

### **[A] The EU's Capabilities for Global Conflict Management**

If we systematise the preceding discussion of existing analyses of the Union's conflict management capabilities, the EU-internal dimension of our analytical framework comprises three sets of relevant factors; that is, capabilities that the Union must possess in order to succeed in conflict management: capabilities to act, to fund, and to cooperate and coordinate (see Figure 1).<sup>7</sup>

Figure 1: The necessary Capabilities for EU conflict management



- (1) Capabilities to act: political will, personnel and hardware as well as institutions and instruments;
- (2) Capabilities to fund: long-term and short-term;
- (3) Capabilities to cooperate and coordinate: among EU member states and institutions, as well as with third parties (individual states and international/regional governmental and non-governmental organisations)

*[B] Capabilities to act*

In terms of capabilities to act, political will is a determining factor for conflict management. State leaders have to agree to be involved as mediators and managers in a conflict. This political will is normally contingent upon state interests and values, and on the type of conflict (limited or widespread), and on the presumed likelihood of the success of any intervention.

This presumed likelihood of success, in turn, is a function of an assessment of how well existing capabilities to act, fund, and coordinate and cooperate are a match for the challenges a given intervention is likely to encounter. Here the EU has made significant progress over the past two decades since the WEU's Petersberg tasks were incorporated into the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Military units of the member states of the WEU could thus be employed for humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Subsequently, issues of personnel and hardware were addressed by several European Council meetings following the inauguration of crisis management as a distinct policy under ESDP in Cologne in 1999. Specifically, the Helsinki European Council in 1999 agreed the so-called Helsinki Headline Goal for the development of appropriate capabilities which were defined as forces capable of undertaking the full range of Petersberg Tasks up to the level of operations requiring corps strength (50-60,000 persons), deployable at this scale within 6 days and for the deployment to be sustained for 60 days. At the 22 November 2004 Military Capabilities Commitment Conference, EU member states offered contributions to thirteen EU Battlegroups as part of Rapid Response elements. The Battle Groups reached full operational capability on 1 January 2007 and with two (of now 18 Battle Groups) of 1500 troops (a battalion sized force and combat support elements) now on a six-monthly stand-by rotation to undertake Petersberg tasks. The member states failed to realise this ambition and the Headline Goal 2010 plan was endorsed by the June 2004 European Council summit meeting held in Brussels with the intention that this would allow the EU member states, by 2010, to "respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the full spectrum of crisis management

operations covered by the Treaty on European Union". However, the intended force was now to be envisioned as only as third as large as the original goal.

While there has been some progress in achieving the Headline Goal, a large number of deficiencies remain in areas crucial for EU's ability to pursue more demanding conflict management policies. The development of appropriate institutions and policy instruments, on the other hand has progressed much faster and more successfully. The Lisbon Treaty's innovations of the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, double-hatting as a Vice-President of the European Commission, and the European External Action Service (EEAS) are the culmination of an almost two-decade long process of institution and capacity building. Predating the Lisbon Treaty, and during the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the creation of the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) have helped diplomatic negotiations with parties in conflict areas. The post of Secretary-General of the Council and High Representative for CSFP (and the initial appointment of former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana to the post) was a significant step forward and indicated that the Union was prepared to follow up on its intentions with substantive commitments. Several other institutions involved in CFSP under the authority of the European Council are also directly relevant to EU crisis management operations, especially the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, and the EU Military Staff, all of which were made permanent under the provisions Nice Treaty and now fall under the management of Baroness Ashton since the Lisbon Treaty's implementation. Our analysis in this area will thus focus on two related aspects: the extent to which the availability of personnel and hardware

(or lack thereof) has stifled the EU's ability to pursue more proactive conflict management policies, and the degree to which the full range of policy instruments was used (or not) in pursuit of constructive conflict management, depending on the ability to back intentions with concrete actions.

*[B] Capabilities to fund*

Capabilities to fund various crisis management operations in the short and the long term do exist within the EU. The provision of long-term funds for CFSP activities is normally not a problem, it certainly has not been a shortage of financial means that has impeded EU conflict management policy. However, the complicated system within the Union to make the use of its funds transparent and accountable has, until two years into the existence of crisis management as distinct Union policy, often hindered their rapid disbursement. An important contribution to the improvement of the EU's short-term funding capabilities, therefore, was the creation of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) in February 2001. Its replacement in 2007 by the Instrument for Stability (IfS) was a further refinement of the EU's capacity to deploy financial resources to deal with issues of conflict prevention, crisis management and peace building. The IfS, is intended as a capacity to respond to the need for financial resources to for situations of crisis or emerging crisis, when more timely financial resources are not available from other EU sources.

The IfS is more flexible and structured than its predecessor the RRM by being divided into short-term and long-term priorities (the RRM was only intended for

activities that did not extend beyond six months). The IfS has a budget of € 2.062 billion covering the period of 2007-2013 and broken down between the short-term component of €1,487 million (72% of the total) and the long-term component of €484 million (23% of the total).

The *short-term* component for 'Crisis response and preparedness' aims to prevent conflict, support post-conflict political stabilisation and to ensure early recovery after a natural disaster. It can only be triggered in a situation of crisis or emerging crisis, in order to re-establish the conditions necessary to the implementation of the Community's development assistance under other long-term instruments. The activities under this component include: support for the development of democratic and pluralistic state institutions, support for international criminal tribunals, promotion of independent and pluralist media, aid for the victims of the illicit use of firearms and support to relieve the impact on the civilian population of anti-personnel landmines.

Under the *long-term* component there are three sets of priorities: fighting and protecting against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; strengthening response capacities of non-EU member countries to cross-border threats such as terrorism and organized crime, including the illicit trafficking of weapons, drugs and human beings; enhancing pre- and post-crisis preparedness capacity building.

In this context, our analysis will therefore concentrate on the flexibility of the IfS to address specific crisis situations, the degree to which the ability to have IfS-funded

actions implemented by a variety of different actors has enhanced the effectiveness of this mechanism to contribute to EU conflict management, the efficiency of transitioning conflict management policy in specific cases from IfS funds to longer-term financing, and the broader question of whether EU funds made available for conflict management are sufficient, given especially the increasing level of activity that the Union is undertaking in this area.

*[B] Capabilities to cooperate and coordinate*

Coordination and cooperation capabilities within the EU have two dimensions: a horizontal one (coordination among the strands of the EU's institutions involved in conflict management) and a vertical one (between the EU as a supranational organisation with its own institutional structures and the EU member states). Thus, our analysis will consider relevant actors' interest structures as well as the opportunities they have to realise these interests on their own or in cooperation with others. The division of labour between institutions in all three pillars and the degree to which this can benefit or frustrate external conflict management policy will be one key focus of analysis, alongside with an assessment of the role played by individual member states in the coordination and implementation of EU policies in this area.

At the external level, coordination and cooperation is essential in particular with NATO, at least until the EU has developed robust military capabilities of its own should it choose to do so. Cooperation with third countries (i.e., non-EU and non-NATO members) and international organisations (UN, OSCE, UNHCR, NGOs) is

accorded high priority by the Union because of its strong commitment to a multilateral approach and its recognition of the mutual benefits of cooperation, given that different organisations ‘specialise’ in different crisis management (and conflict prevention) tasks. Our analysis in this area will therefore need to focus on two aspects: to what extent the expected benefits of multilateralism have been realised and in how far the EU’s mechanisms and procedures for coordination and cooperation with third parties have been effective on the ground.

All three sets of capabilities are, to a relatively large extent, under the control of the EU.<sup>8</sup> Yet, the effectiveness of the EU’s conflict interventions does not only depend on its own capabilities, it is also subject to the dynamics of a situation on the ground in the actual conflict, in particular on the willingness and ability of local conflict parties to submit to, or resist, external conflict management efforts, which in turn is shaped by a wide variety of different factors (of which the EU itself is only one among many). In order to categorise these different factors and understand their interplay and impact on a given conflict—and thus on the EU’s ability to manage it successfully—we now turn to adapting a well-known analytical model from international relations theory to our own purposes.

### **[A] From Capabilities to Context**

The analysis of the causes of success and failure of EU conflict management, however, cannot stop at the assessment of the Union’s capabilities alone. Central to our argument and to the subsequent case studies and comparative examination of civilian and military conflict management is the contention that, apart from

capabilities, it is the context of a given conflict situation that is crucial to shaping the outcome of any intervention. Thus, our framework requires a substantive component of context analysis in order to offer meaningful explanations for various degrees of success and failure that have arguably characterised EU conflict management operations to date. Here, we draw conceptually on a long-established tradition in IR scholarship going back more than five decades to 1961 when J. David Singer published an article in *World Politics* entitled 'The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations' in which he made a strong case for distinguishing between systemic (global) and subsystem (nation-state) levels for the analysis of various processes in the international system (Singer 1961).

While Singer offers good general guidance on the levels-of-analysis approach, his counsel is primarily geared towards deciding which one of the two levels that he identifies should be chosen, rather than giving scholars and analysts a choice of combining the two levels in their analysis. Two years earlier, Kenneth N. Waltz, had offered a consideration of three images (i.e., levels of analysis) in accounting for the occurrence of war, and had suggested that neither human nature nor the aggressive behaviour of states alone accounted for war, but rather that the nature of the international system and the expectation of violence within it led to war (Waltz 1959). As Jack Levy has pointed out, the levels-of-analysis approach, in the tradition of Singer and Waltz, was subsequently mostly used in IR scholarship to classify 'independent variables that explain state foreign policy behaviour and international outcomes' (Levy 2001). Levy also emphasises that '[i]t is logically possible and in fact usually desirable for explanations to combine causal variables from different levels

of analysis, because whether war or peace occurs is usually determined by multiple variables operating at more than one level of analysis' (Levy 2001). Despite the traditional focus on states and their relations with one another, there is nothing inherently prohibitive in the levels-of-analysis approach to extend its application to non-state actors and structures and to a range of 'issues' that fall somewhere outside the actor and structure dichotomy yet remain important independent variables when accounting for the causes of conflicts within and across, rather than between states and for the success or failure of specific policies adopted to prevent, manage or settle them.

Implicitly or explicitly, earlier models for the analysis of, in particular ethnic, conflict have drawn on a levels-of-analysis approach (Brubaker 1996; Smith 2002a; Wolff 2003). Most notably among them, Michael Brown, synthesising the state of the discipline some fifteen years ago, suggested a two stage model accounting for so-called underlying and proximate causes of conflicts. This was in itself a significant advance in the study of internal conflict, as it brought into focus a shortcoming of much of the literature until then which had done 'a commendable job of surveying the underlying factors or permissive conditions that make some situations particularly prone to violence, but [had remained] weak when it [came] to identifying the catalytic factors—the triggers or proximate causes—of internal conflicts' (Brown 1996). Among the underlying causes he identified structural, political, economic and social, and cultural and perceptual factors, individually or in various combinations, as necessary, but not sufficient conditions for the outbreak of conflict. He then used a variation of the levels-of-analysis approach to account for the

impact of proximate causes. Presenting a 2-by-2 matrix, Brown (1996) distinguishes between internal and external elite and mass-level factors that he argues are responsible for triggering conflicts.

This two-level approach is consistent with the traditional neo-realist distinction between the system level and the unit level, but it deprives us of a more nuanced analysis. The terminology used by Brown to describe external-level factors ('bad neighbours', 'bad neighbourhoods') emphasises the regional level, which is undoubtedly of great importance, but he does so at the expense of the global level.<sup>9</sup>

While Brown makes some reference to broader international developments, such as 'sharp reductions in international financial assistance' and 'sharp declines in commodity prices', more recent literature has identified a range of other factors well beyond a (potential) conflict's immediate neighbourhood. These include diaspora communities (Adamson 2005; Collier 2001; Sheffer 2003), international human rights norms and their use in the justification of outside intervention into internal conflicts (Holzgrefe and Keohane 2003), the moral hazard that intervention precedents create (Crawford and Kuperman 2006), and links between ethnic conflict and organised crime (Goodhand 2004; Kemp 2005, 2004; Williams 2001). Since September 2001, there is also an emerging body of evidence that local conflicts, especially those involving Muslim minorities, have been instrumentalised by al-Qaeda and its local off-shoots in their pursuit of global jihad (Abuza 2003; Frost et al. 2003; Smith 2005).

Equally, at the internal level, Brown subsumes national-level and local-level factors into one single category, which is also not unproblematic. For example, it is entirely

plausible to attribute a significant share of the blame for the violent escalation of the conflicts in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s and in Kosovo in the second half of the 1990s to bad political leaders (i.e., to internal elite-triggered factors in Brown's terminology). Yet, this glosses over significant, and policy-relevant differences, apart from the fact that the United Kingdom was a democracy in the late 1960s, while the former Yugoslavia was at best in a state of arrested transition between communist regime and liberal democratic market economy. The situation in Northern Ireland was very much a local affair between two communities with very different and incompatible conceptions of national belonging exacerbated by economic decline and, at the time, negligible concern by the central government in London. Kosovo, on the other hand, was a conflict primarily between a local secessionist movement and the increasingly repressive institutions of the central government in Belgrade. Thus, while Northern Ireland in the late 1960s had a realistic chance of effective conflict management and settlement by way of a central government acting as an arbiter,<sup>10</sup> this was an opportunity that did not at all exist in the Kosovo case.

Therefore, we propose an analytical model that disaggregates the traditional two levels of analysis into four. At each of these levels, analysis should concern itself with the behaviour and impact of both actors and structures on the onset, duration, and termination of ethnic conflicts. The four levels are:

1. The local (or substate) level: existing scholarship<sup>11</sup> suggests that among state actors and structures, local elites/leaders, authorities and representatives of the central government, established institutional arrangements and socio-economic structures play a decisive role, while among non-state actors and

structures it is the locally resident communities/ethnic groups/religious groups and their elites/leaders and locally operating NGOs, rebel forces, private sector interest groups, and criminals whose actions and effects are likely to have an impact. For example, for rebel forces with a clear territorial base in part of the state affected by conflict (e.g., in the South Caucasus, Moldova, and the Western Balkans), specific local dynamics would need to be considered alongside those at the national level of analysis, regardless of whether the overall aim of the movement is secession, control of local resources or state capture. The same holds true for conflicts that are relatively locally contained or where the stakes are of a more localised nature (e.g., in the eastern DRC).

2. The state (or national) level: this level of analysis contains essentially the same kinds of actors and structures as they exist at the local level and it is difficult to imagine situations in which there would be no relevant factors at the state level of analysis. For example the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as in Transnistria, had, at least in the early 1990s, a very clear local dimension, but at the same time could not be fully explained without reference to political, social, economic and cultural dynamics at the state level in Georgia and Moldova—the balance of power and influence of different political parties, the strength of resurgent national sentiment among the titular nations in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the social and economic impact of independence and of the contested nature of emerging states, etc.

3. The regional level: scholarship on regional security and regional conflict would suggest that relevant neighbouring states and their institutions, regional powers, and regional IOs, as well as their respective elites/leaders, and established structures of political and economic cooperation are the key variables to consider among state structures and institutions, while cross-border/trans-national networks (ethnic, religious, civil society, business, organised crime, rebel groups, etc.) and their elites/leaders are the relevant non-state equivalents. This is very obvious in the cases of Afghanistan and the break-away territories in Georgia and Moldova, and equally significant in the case of the eastern DRC and across the conflicts in the Western Balkans and in Cyprus.
4. The global level of analysis: this level benefits from a large body of existing scholarship, suggesting that powerful states and IOs of global reach and their elites/leaders are the relevant state actors and structures, while INGOs, diaspora groups, international organised crime networks, and TNCs, as well as their respective elites/leaders are those worthy of consideration among non-state actors and structures. Most prominently, this is the case with Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but it also applies to most of our other cases, including in particular Afghanistan, Georgia, and the Western Balkans.

In addition to structures and actors, we consider it worthwhile to examine the impact on conflicts of a range of issues that cannot easily be classified as either actor- or structure related. These include environmental degradation, resource scarcity, energy security, food security, communicable diseases, etc., all of which by their very

nature cannot easily be ‘assigned’ to one particular level of analysis, but rather straddle the boundaries between several levels. For example, energy security is a major factor in the South Caucasus, while environmental degradation, food security, and resource scarcity matter significantly in sub-Saharan Africa.

Table 1.1: The Levels-of-Analysis Approach

	State Structures and Actors	Non-state Structures and Actors	‘Issues’
Local	local elites/leaders, authorities and representatives of the central government, established institutional arrangements and socio-economic structures	locally resident communities/ethnic groups/religious groups and their elites/leaders and locally operating NGOs, rebel forces, private sector interest groups, and criminals	environmental degradation, resource scarcity, energy security, food security, communicable diseases, etc.
State	national elites/leaders, central government, established institutional arrangements and	communities/ethnic groups/religious groups and their elites/leaders and state-wide operating NGOs, rebel forces,	

	socio-economic structures	private sector interest groups, and criminals	
Regional	neighbouring states and their institutions, regional powers, and regional IOs, as well as their respective elites/leaders; established structures of political and economic cooperation	cross-border/trans-national networks (ethnic, religious, civil society, business, organised crime, rebel groups, etc.) and their elites/leaders	
Global	powerful states and IOs of global reach and their elites/leaders	INGOs, diaspora groups, international organised crime networks, and TNCs, as well as their respective elites/leaders	

### [A] Conclusion

Our chapter began with a brief examination of the state of the field of the EU's role as a global conflict manager, and we found that not only are existing relevant theories of international organisation, international intervention, conflict resolution and of EU foreign policy relatively unconnected but they also do not offer a comprehensive enough framework that could help us understand why the EU might succeed or fail

in specific conflict interventions. In order to bridge this gap, we propose to combine an analysis of the EU's internal capabilities to act, fund, and coordinate and cooperate with an analysis of external factors at local, state, regional and global level that shape a specific conflict and thus co-determine the success or failure of a specific intervention.

This approach is reflected in the structure of our book. Following this introduction, the two chapters by Carmen Gebhard and Alistair Shepherd provide an analysis of origins, nature and evolution of the EU's institutions and policies for conflict management. This empirically detailed and conceptual exploration of the actor at the centre of our investigation forms the 'organisational' background to the following seven chapters in which our contributors examine specific cases of EU conflict management in practice, explaining the Union's performance in conflicts in Afghanistan (Eva Gross), Africa (Gorm Rye Olsen), Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia (Annemarie Peen Rodt & Stefan Wolff), Cyprus (James Ker-Lindsay), Georgia (Richard Whitman & Stefan Wolff), the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Asaf Siniver), and Moldova (Claire Gordon). The three subsequent chapters thereafter offer a comparative analysis of different EU policies, instruments and approaches. Cornelius Adebahr considers the role the EU's Special Representatives in the making and delivering of conflict management, Annemarie Peen Rodt examines the Union's military crisis management operations to date, and Nicoletta Pirozzi discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the EU's civilian management efforts.

Using our analytical framework that combines internal and external factors, the individual and comparative case studies help us to understand better the dynamics of specific past and present EU conflict interventions and the varied factors that can explain their success and/or failure. On that basis, our concluding chapter at the of this book then draws some broader conclusions about the effectiveness of EU conflict management, identifies strengths and weaknesses, and makes recommendations as to necessary changes in the EU's approach to conflict management. In other words, the dual focus on EU-internal factors and conflict-specific external factors in the empirical material in our book enables us to identify the causes why some conflicts can be resolved relatively easily, while others become protracted and seemingly resolution-proof, i.e., what issues need to be addressed (in the EU and/or in a particular conflict environment) in order to facilitate more effective conflict management.

- Abuza, Z. 2003. *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*. Boulder, CO Lynne Rienner.
- Adamson, Fiona B. 2005. "Globalisation, Transnational Political Mobilisation, and Networks of Violence." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 18 (1):31-49.
- Averre, Derek. 2005. "Russia and the European Union: Convergence or Divergence?" *European Security* 14 (2):175 - 202.
- Averre, Derek. 2009. "Competing Rationalities: Russia, the EU and the 'Shared Neighbourhood'." *Europe-Asia Studies* 61 (10):1689 - 713.
- Bagoyoko, Niagalé, and Marie V. Gibert. 2009. "The Linkage between Security, Governance and Development: the European Union in Africa." *Journal of Development Studies* 45 (5):789 - 814.
- Bird, Tim. 2007. "The European Union and Counter-insurgency: Capability, Credibility, and Political Will." *Contemporary Security Policy* 28 (1):182 - 96.
- Blockmans, Steven, and Ramses A Wessel. 2009. "The European Union and Crisis Management: Will the Lisbon Treaty Make the EU More Effective?" *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 14 (2):265-308.
- Brosig, Malte. 2010. "The Multi-actor Game of Peacekeeping in Africa." *International Peacekeeping* 17 (3):327 - 42.
- Brown, Michael E., ed. 1996. *The international dimensions of internal conflict*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 1996. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Buzan, Barry, and Ole Wæver. 2003. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cannizzaro, Enzo ed. 2002. *The European Union as an Actor in International Relations*. The Hague: Kluwer International Law.
- Carr, F., and T. Callan. 2002. *Managing Conflict in the New Europe: The Role of International Institutions*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Chappell, Laura. 2009. "Differing member state approaches to the development of the EU Battlegroup Concept: implications for CSDP." *European Security*:417 - 39.
- Charbonneau, Bruno. 2009. "What Is So Special about the European Union? EU–UN Cooperation in Crisis Management in Africa." *International Peacekeeping* 16 (4):546 - 61.
- Collier, Paul. 2001. "Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy." In *Turbulent Peace. The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, ed. C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson and P. Aall. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 1998. "On economic causes of civil war." *Oxford Economic Papers* 50 (4):563-73.
- Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2005. "Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (4):625-33.
- Collier, Paul, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2002. "Understanding Civil War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (1):3-12.
- Commission, European. 2011. "A new response to a changing Neighbourhood." Brussels: European Commission.
- Coppieters, Bruno, Michael Emerson, Michel Huysseune, Tamara Kovziridze, Gergana Noutcheva, Nathalie Tocci, and Marius Vahl, eds. 2004. *Europeanization and Conflict Resolution: Case Studies from the European Periphery*. Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues.
- Cordell, Karl, and Stefan Wolff. 2009. *Ethnic Conflict: Causes—Consequences—Responses*. Polity: Cambridge.
- Cornish, Paul, and Geoffrey Edwards. 2001. "Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: the beginnings of a European strategic culture." *International Affairs* 77 (3):587-603.
- Cornish, Paul, and Geoffrey Edwards. 2005. "The strategic culture of the European Union: a progress report." *International Affairs* 81 (4):801-20.
- Crawford, Timothy, and Alan Kuperman, eds. 2006. *Gambling on Humanitarian Intervention*. London: Routledge.
- Dannreuther, Roland ed. 2003. *European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy*. London: Routledge.
- Delcour, Laure. 2010. "The European Union, a security provider in the eastern neighbourhood?" *European Security* 19 (4):535 - 49.
- Devine, Karen. 2009. "Irish Political Parties' Attitudes towards Neutrality and the Evolution of the EU's Foreign, Security and Defence Policies." *Irish Political Studies* 24 (4):467 - 90.
- Diehl, Paul F., and Joseph Lepgold, eds. 2003. *Regional Conflict Management*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Diez, Thomas, ed. 2002. *Enlargement and Reconciliation: EU Accession and the Division of Cyprus*. Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues.
- Diez, Thomas, Ian Manners, and Richard G. Whitman. 2011. "The Changing Nature of International Institutions in Europe: the Challenge of the European Union." *Journal of European Integration* 33 (2):117 - 38.
- Diez, Thomas, Stephan Stetter, and Mathias Albert. 2006. "The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration." *International Organization* 60 (03):563-93.
- Duke, Simon. 2003. "Regional Organisations and Conflict Prevention: CFSP and ESDI in Europe." In *Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion?*, ed. D. Carment and A. Schnabel. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Duke, Simon. 2008. "The Future of EU–NATO Relations: a Case of Mutual Irrelevance Through Competition?" *Journal of European Integration* 30 (1):27 - 43.
- Emerson, Michael, Marius Vahl, Bruno Coppieters, Michel Huysseune, Tamara Kovziridze, Gergana Noutcheva, and Nathalie Tocci. 2004. "Elements of Comparison and Synthesis." *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 5 (1).
- Ferreira-Pereira, Laura C. 2007. "Between Scylla and Charybdis: Assessing Portugal's Approach to the Common Foreign and Security Policy." *Journal of European Integration* 29 (2):209 - 28.
- Fowkes, Ben. 2001. *Ethnicity and ethnic conflict in the post-communist world*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Frost, Frank, Ann Rann, and Andrew Chin. 2003. "Terrorism in Southeast Asia." Canberra: Parliament of Australia.

- Gebhard, Carmen , and Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen. 2011. "Making sense of EU comprehensive security towards conceptual and analytical clarity." *European Security* 20 (2):221-41.
- Gegout, Catherine. 2009. "EU Conflict Management in Africa: The Limits of an International Actor." *Ethnopolitics* 8 (3):403 - 15.
- Giegerich, Bastian. 2008. "EU Crisis Management: Ambitions and Achievements." *The Adelphi Papers* 48 (397):15 - 34.
- Giegerich, Bastian. 2010. "Military and Civilian Capabilities for EU-led Crisis-Management Operations." *Adelphi Series* 50 (414):41 - 58.
- Goodhand, Jonathan 2004. "Afghanistan in Central Asia." In *War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges for Transformation*, ed. M. Pugh, N. Cooper and J. Goodhand. Boulder, CO Lynne Rienner.
- Gordon, Claire. 2009. "The Stabilization and Association Process in the Western Balkans: An Effective Instrument of Post-conflict Management?" *Ethnopolitics* 8 (3):325 - 40.
- Gordon, Stuart. 2006. "Exploring the Civil–Military Interface and its Impact on European Strategic and Operational Personalities: ‘Civilianisation’ and Limiting Military Roles in Stabilisation Operations?" *European Security* 15 (3):339 - 61.
- Gourlay, Catriona. 2004. "European Union procedures and resources for crisis management." *International Peacekeeping* 11 (3):404 - 21.
- Gross, Eva. 2007. "Germany and European Security and Defence Cooperation: The Europeanization of National Crisis Management Policies?" *Security Dialogue* 38 (4):501-20.
- Hardt, Heidi. 2009. "Rapid response or evasive action? Regional organization responses to peace operation demands." *European Security* 18 (4):383 - 415.
- Hazelzet, Hadewych. 2006. "Human Rights Aspects of EU Crisis Management Operations: From Nuisance to Necessity." *International Peacekeeping* 13 (4):564 - 81.
- Holliday, Graham, ed. 2004. *EU Enlargement and Minority Rights*. Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues.
- Holzgreffe, J. L., and R. O. Keohane. 2003. *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. *Ethnic groups in conflict*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Howorth, Jolyon. 2003. "France, Britain and the Euro-Atlantic Crisis." *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 45 (4):173 - 92.
- Howorth, Jolyon, and Anand Menon. 2009. "Still Not Pushing Back." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53 (5):727-44.
- Ilievski, Zoran, and Dane Taleski. 2009. "Was the EU's Role in Conflict Management in Macedonia a Success?" *Ethnopolitics* 8 (3):355 - 67.
- Irondele, Bastien, and Frédéric Mérand. 2010. "France's return to NATO: the death knell for ESDP?" *European Security* 19 (1):29 - 43.
- Jacoby, Wade, and Christopher Jones. 2008. "The EU Battle Groups in Sweden and the Czech Republic: What National Defense Reforms Tell Us about European Rapid Reaction Capabilities." *European Security* 17 (2):315 - 38.
- Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. 2006. "The ESDP and Civilian Rapid Reaction: Adding Value is Harder than Expected." *European Security* 15 (3):299 - 321.
- Kaufman, Stuart J. 2001. *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War*. Ithaka, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kemp, Walter A. 2004. "The Business of Ethnic Conflict." *Security Dialogue* 35 (1):43-59.
- Kemp, Walter A. 2005. "Selfish Determination: The Questionable Ownership of Autonomy Movements." *Ethnopolitics* 4 (1):85-99.
- Knutsen, Bjørn Olav. 2009. "The EU's security and defense policy (ESDP) and the challenges of civil–military coordination (CMCO): the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)." *European Security*:441 - 59.
- Kronenberger, Vincent, and Jan Wouters, eds. 2004. *The EU and Conflict Prevention*. The Hague: TMC Asser Press.
- Lake, D. A., and P. M. Morgan. 1997. *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*. State College: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Lake, David A., and Donald Rothchild. 1996. "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict." *International Security* 21 (2):41-75.
- Larsen, Henrik. 2002. "The EU: A Global Military Actor?" *Cooperation and Conflict* 37 (3):283-302.
- Levy, Jack S. 2001. "Theories of Interstate and Intrastate War: A Levels-of-Analysis Approach." In *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, ed. C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson and P. Aall. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

- Lintonen, Raimo. 2004. "Understanding EU Crisis Decision-making: The Case of Chechnya and the Finnish Presidency." *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management* 12 (1):29-38.
- Longhurst, Kerry, and Alister Miskimmon. 2007. "Same Challenges, Diverging Responses: Germany, the UK and European Security." *German Politics* 16 (1):79 - 94.
- Mace, Catriona. 2004. "Operation Concordia: developing a 'European' approach to crisis management?" *International Peacekeeping* 11 (3):474 - 90.
- Mahncke, Dieter, Alicia Ambos, and Christopher Reynolds, eds. 2004. *European Foreign Policy: From Rhetoric to Reality* Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
- Marsh, Steve, and Hans Mackenstein. 2005. *The International Relations of the European Union*. Harlow: Longman.
- Menon, Anand. 2009. "Empowering paradise? The ESDP at ten." *International Affairs* 85 (2):227-46.
- Menon, Anand, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. 2010. "Instruments and Intentionality: Civilian Crisis Management and Enlargement Conditionality in EU Security Policy." *West European Politics* 33 (1):75 - 92.
- Mérand, Frédéric, Mathias Bonneu, and Samuel Faure. 2009. "What do ESDP actors want? An exploratory analysis." *European Security* 18 (3):327 - 44.
- Morsut, Claudia. 2009. "Effective Multilateralism? EU–UN Cooperation in the DRC, 2003–2006." *International Peacekeeping* 16 (2):261 - 72.
- Olsen, Gorm Rye. 2002. "The EU and Conflict Management in African Emergencies." *International Peacekeeping* 9 (3):87 - 102.
- Olsen, Gorm Rye. 2008. "Coherence, consistency and political will in foreign policy: The European Union's Policy towards Africa." *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 9 (2):157 - 71.
- Olsen, Gorm Rye. 2009. "The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe?" *International Peacekeeping* 16 (2):245 - 60.
- Olsen, Gorm Rye, and Jess Pilegaard. 2005. "The Costs of Non-Europe? Denmark and the Common Security and Defence Policy." *European Security* 14 (3):339 - 60.
- Otunnu, O.A., and Michael W. Doyle. 1998. *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Piiparinen, Touko. 2008. "Pushing the Boundaries of the Possible at the Margins of Peacekeeping: The Promises of ESDP–Russia Co-operation for Humanitarian Intervention." *Global Society* 22 (2):277 - 95.
- Posen, Barry R. 2006. "European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?" *Security Studies* 15 (2):149 - 86.
- Pugh, Michael, and W.P. Singh Sidhu. 2003. *The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Rieker, Pernille. 2009. "The EU — A Capable Security Actor? Developing Administrative Capabilities." *Journal of European Integration* 31 (6):703 - 19.
- Rodt, Annemarie Peen, and Stefan Wolff. 2010. "The Reactive Crisis Management of the European Union in the Western Balkans: Policy Objectives, Capabilities and Effectiveness." In *International Intervention in Local Conflicts: Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution since the Cold War*, ed. U. Rabi. London: I.B. Taurus.
- Rotberg, Robert I., ed. 2004. *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rubin, Barnett. 2001. "Conceptual Overview of the Origin, Structure, and Dynamics of Regional Conflict Formations." In *Conference on Regional Conflict Formation in the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa: Structure, Dynamics and Challenges for Policy*. Safari Park Hotel, Nairobi, Kenya.
- Sasse, Gwendolyn. 2008. "The European Neighbourhood Policy: Conditionality Revisited for the EU's Eastern Neighbours." *Europe-Asia Studies* 60 (2):295 - 316.
- Sasse, Gwendolyn. 2009. "The European Neighbourhood Policy and Conflict Management: A Comparison of Moldova and the Caucasus." *Ethnopolitics* 8 (3):369 - 86.
- Sasse, Gwendolyn, James Hughes, and Claire Gordon. 2004. *Europeanization and Regionalization in EU's Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: The Myth of Conditionality*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Scherrer, Christian P. 2003. *Structural Prevention of Ethnic Violence*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Sebastian, Sofia. 2009. "The Role of the EU in the Reform of Dayton in Bosnia-Herzegovina." *Ethnopolitics* 8 (3):341 - 54.
- Sheffer, Gabriel. 2003. *Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Singer, J. David. 1961. "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations." *World Politics* 14 (1):77-92.

- Smith, David. 2002a. "Framing the National Question in Central and Eastern Europe: A Quadratic Nexus?" *Ethnopolitics* 2 (1):3-16.
- Smith, Hazel. 2002b. *European Union Foreign Policy: What it is and What it Does*. London: Pluto.
- Smith, Karen E. 2003. *European Union Policy in a Changing World*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Smith, Michael J. 2004. *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, P.J. 2005. *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Stewart, Emma J. 2008. "Restoring EU–OSCE Cooperation for Pan-European Conflict Prevention." *Contemporary Security Policy* 29 (2):266 - 84.
- Tellis, Ashley J. 1997. *Anticipating Ethnic Conflict*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
- Thakur, Ramesh, and Albrecht Schnabel. 2001. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Tocci, Nathalie. 2005. "Conflict Resolution in the Neighbourhood: Comparing EU Involvement in Turkey's Kurdish Question and in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict." *Mediterranean Politics* 10 (2):125 - 46.
- Tocci, Nathalie. 2007. *The EU's Role in Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the European Neighbourhood*. London: Routledge.
- Tocci, Nathalie. 2009. "Firm in Rhetoric, Compromising in Reality: The EU in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict." *Ethnopolitics* 8 (3):387 - 401.
- Toggenburg, Gabriel von, ed. 2005. *Minority Protection and the EU: The Way Forward*. Budapest: LGI.
- Ulriksen, Ståle, Catriona Gourlay, and Catriona Mace. 2004. "Operation Artemis: the shape of things to come?" *International Peacekeeping* 11 (3):508 - 25.
- Union, Council of the European. 2011. "Council conclusions on conflict prevention. 3101st Foreign Affairs Council meeting (20 June 2011)". Luxembourg: Council of the European Union.
- Vachudova, Milada A. 2005. *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wagnsson, Charlotte. 2010. "Divided power Europe: normative divergences among the EU 'big three'." *Journal of European Public Policy* 17 (8):1089 - 105.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959. *Man, the State and War*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Whitman, Richard G., and Stefan Wolff. 2010a. "The EU as a conflict manager? The case of Georgia and its implications." *International Affairs* 87 (1):87-107.
- Whitman, Richard G., and Stefan Wolff, eds. 2010b. *The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective: Context, Implementation, and Impact*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Williams, M.J. 2011. "Empire Lite Revisited: NATO, the Comprehensive Approach and State-building in Afghanistan." *International Peacekeeping* 18 (1):64-78.
- Williams, P. 2001. "Transnational Criminal Enterprises, Conflict and Instability." In *Turbulent Peace. The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, ed. C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson and P. Aall. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Wilson, Andrew, and Nicu Popescu. 2009. "Russian and European neighbourhood policies compared." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 9 (3):317 - 31.
- Wolff, Stefan. 2001. "Context and Content: Sunningdale and Belfast Compared." In *Aspects of the Belfast Agreement*, ed. R. Wilford. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wolff, Stefan. 2003. *Disputed territories: The transnational dynamics of ethnic conflict settlement*. New York, NY: Berghahn.
- Wolff, Stefan. 2008. "Learning the Lessons of Ethnic Conflict Management? Conditional Recognition and International Administration in the Western Balkans since the 1990s." *Nationalities Papers* 36 (3):553-71.
- Wolff, Stefan. 2011. "The regional dimensions of state failure." *Review of International Studies* 37 (03):951-72.
- Yakinthou, Christalla. 2009. "The EU's Role in the Cyprus Conflict: System Failure or Structural Metamorphosis?" *Ethnopolitics* 8 (3):307 - 23.
- Youngs, Richard. 2008. "Fusing Security and Development: Just Another Euro-platitude?" *Journal of European Integration* 30 (3):419 - 37.

---

<sup>1</sup> Accounts for EU motivations to become involved in different conflicts vary considerably. Cf., for example, Hazelzet (2006), Knutsen (2009), Larsen (2002), Lintonen (2004), Menon and Sedelmeier (2010), and Olsen (2009).

<sup>2</sup> For a detailed discussion of the EU's comprehensive approach to security, see (Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen 2011).

<sup>3</sup> For early, influential studies setting the standards in this strand of the literature, see Cannizzaro (2002), Dannreuther (2003), Mahncke, Ambos, and Reynolds (2004), Marsh and Mackenstein (Marsh and Mackenstein 2005), Smith (2002b), Smith (Smith 2003), and Smith (2004).

<sup>4</sup> The role of smaller member states in ESDP/CFSP development and implementation has also been explored, among others by Olsen (2005) and Gordon (2006) in relation to Denmark, by Ferreira-Pereira (2007) in relation to Portugal, and by Devine (2009) in relation to Ireland.

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, Lake and Morgan (1997), Thakur and Schnabel (2001), Pugh and Singh Sidhu (2003), Diehl and Lepgold (2003), and Otunnu and Doyle (1998).

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, Duke (2003), Diez (2002), Holliday (2004), Sasse, Hughes and Gordon (2004), von Toggenburg (2005), and Vachudova (2005).

<sup>7</sup> In this section, we draw on earlier work, including primarily Wolff (2008), as well as Peen Rodt and Wolff (2010) and Whitman and Wolff (2010a).

---

<sup>8</sup> This EU control is, however, dependent on member state cooperation. In the third area, in relation to cooperation with third parties, EU control is most limited.

<sup>9</sup> Another valuable analysis of the regional dimension of (ethnic) conflicts is Lake and Rothchild (1996); see also Cordell and Wolff (2009). For an application of the model developed here to state failure, see Wolff (2011).

<sup>10</sup> The reasons why an initially promising initiative to this effect did not succeed are analysed in Wolff (2001).

<sup>11</sup> Here, and below, we draw on a range of original and synthetic sources, including Adamson (2005), (Brown 1996), Buzan (2003), Carr (2002), Collier and Hoeffler (2005, 1998), Collier and Sambanis (2002), Cordell and Wolff (2009), Fowkes (2001), Horowitz (1985), Kaufman (2001), Lake and Morgan (1997), Lake and Rothchild (1996), Rotberg (2004), Rubin (2001), Scherrer (2003), and Tellis (1997).