Complex Power Sharing and the Centrality of Territorial Self-governance in Contemporary Conflict Settlements

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Introduction
Self-determination disputes are considered to be among the most intractable, violent, and destructive forms of conflict that societies, states, and the international community have had, and continue, to face. This view is empirically correct if one looks at the apparently unending conflicts that have plagued places as diverse as Sri Lanka, northeast India, Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region of Africa, Sudan, the Middle East, and the Caucasus, among others. The conflicts in these areas have cost millions of lives, displaced multiple more people, wrecked entire national economies for decades, and they seem to be “solution-proof.”

Yet, a corrective view to this initially very bleak picture is necessary. Not all self-determination conflicts are violent and destructive: Quebec and Belgium are two cases in point, but there was no serious violence in Crimea, Romania, Slovakia, and the Baltic states either despite the highly charged atmosphere between these countries’ majority and minority populations, nor were the separations of Slovenia from socialist Yugoslavia, of Macedonia from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or of Montenegro from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro characterised by the same degree of bloodshed. Not all self-determination conflicts evade solutions either: in Western Europe, Northern Ireland, the Swiss Jura and South Tyrol are clear examples for the possibility of sustainable peace after violent conflict. The region of the Western Balkans, despite many other shortcomings, has not returned to the violence it experienced throughout the 1990s and early 21st century. Constitutional arrangements in Aceh (Indonesia), Bougainville (Papua New Guinea), Mindanao (Philippines), and Gagauzia (Moldova), likewise, may not be perfect, but they have provided an institutional setting in which ethnic groups can pursue their self-determination claims by political, non-violent means.

Despite the growing number of cases in which an institutional accommodation of self-determination claims is achieved short of secession or partition that takes the form of territorial self-governance; and in which relations between identity groups are institutionally established as power sharing at the local and/or central level, relatively little systematic comparative work has been undertaken and the settlements themselves, which can be considered as examples of the practice of complex power sharing (Weller 2008; Wolff 2007, 2008) also remain under-theorised. While it is not possible to develop a full-fledged theory of complex power sharing here, some progress can nevertheless be made towards a more systematic comparison of conflict settlement processes, that is, towards the institutional arrangements adopted (or not) to accommodate self-determination claims. In order to do this, I proceed in three steps. First, I clarify the concept of complex power sharing and situate in the context of existing theories of conflict resolution, thus establishing an analytical framework for the subsequent empirical analysis. Second, I compare and contrast a number of cases of conflict and conflict settlements to illustrate this practice of institutional design of complex power sharing. Third, I draw some conclusions about the potential theoretical and practical relevance of complex power sharing for the resolution of self-determination conflicts.

The Concept of Complex Power Sharing
A striking feature of contemporary conflict resolution practice in cases of self-determination disputes is that a very significant number of actual and proposed settlements involve forms of territorial self-governance. This reflects the assumption, but not necessarily the reality, that such regimes can contribute to sub-state, state, regional and international stability. In ethnically, linguistically and/or religiously heterogeneous societies in which corresponding group identities have formed and become salient, the
degree of self-governance enjoyed by the different segments of society is often seen as more or less directly proportional to the level of acceptance of an overall institutional framework within which these different segments come together. Self-governance regimes are thus also meant to provide institutional solutions that allow the different segments of diverse societies to realise their aspirations for self-determination while simultaneously preserving the overall social and territorial integrity of existing states. In doing so, self-governance regimes above all offer mechanisms for conflict parties to settle their disputes by peaceful means (cf. Weller and Wolff 2005).

There is a large number of such settlements that provide evidence for this trend in North America (Canada), Central and South America (Panama, Colombia, Mexico, Ecuador and Nicaragua), Africa (Sudan, Zanzibar), Asia (Iraq, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Philippines), and Europe (Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Italy, Spain, Macedonia, Moldova, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Ukraine and United Kingdom).

In addition, proposals for self-governance regimes also figure prominently in proposed peace agreements, including in the Annan Plan for Cyprus, the Georgian president’s peace initiative for South Ossetia, and Sri Lanka. Thus in virtually every conflict situation involving self-determination claims by territorially relatively concentrated identity groups at least proposals for territorial self-governance have been made. In many of them, these proposals have been implemented.

Yet, without exception, these cases also demonstrate that territorial self-governance on its own is insufficient to offer viable solutions to self-determination conflicts. Because of the complexity of such conflicts in terms of the parties directly or indirectly involved in them and their competing demands, further conflict resolution mechanisms are required to ensure that an overall stable and durable democratic settlement can be achieved. This has been increasingly understood by practitioners of conflict resolution and has led to an emerging practice of conflict settlement referred to as “complex power sharing”.

Complex power sharing, in the way it is understood here, refers to a practice of conflict settlement that has a form of self-governance regime at its heart, but whose overall institutional design includes a range of further mechanisms for the accommodation of ethnic diversity in divided societies, including those recommended by advocates of liberal consociationalism (e.g., McGarry and O’Leary 2004a and b, McGarry 2006, O’Leary 2005a), integration (e.g., Horowitz 1985[2000], 1990, 1991, 2002, 2004, 2006, Reilly 2001, Sisk 1996, Wimmer 2003) and power dividing (Roeder and Rothchild 2005). Complex power sharing, thus, is the result of the implementation of a self-governance regime whose success as an approach to conflict settlement requires a relatively complex institutional structure that cannot be reduced to autonomy/(ethno-)federalism, (traditional) models of power sharing or power dividing.

The complexity of conflict resolution practice and the centrality of territorial self-governance has been long neglected, or had its relevance and importance denied, in other theories of conflict resolution. Advocates of integration and power dividing generally reject the idea of territorial self-governance for communities seeking self-determination as destabilising, and variably propose ‘non-ethnic’ federalism or at least splitting communities across several territorial entities. Proponents of (liberal) consociational power sharing, only recently have pointed out the important connections between, and complementarity of, consociation and territorial forms of self-governance, thus seeking to fill a significant gap in power sharing theory.

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1 In some cases (e.g., Georgia, Sri Lanka) the sincerity and/or acceptability of these proposals might be questioned. In others (e.g., Mindanao, Kirkuk, Kosovo) their implementation has been difficult at best, highlighting that that such agreements often do not bring about the immediate cessation of conflict, but may be viewed as starting points for its eventual end. The fate of the 1998 Agreement on Northern Ireland illustrates this point.
Beyond links and complementarity, however, there are also a number of specific instances in which the provision for institutions of territorial self-governance is essential for the successful negotiation, implementation and sustainable operation of conflict settlements, regardless of which other mechanisms of conflict resolution complete the final deal that the conflict parties agree. Institutions for territorial self-governance are generally needed in conflict situations involving territorially compact communities willing to accept self-governance in the region they inhabit as the way in which they express their right to self-determination (cf. Gurr 1993, Coakley 2003). This can take different forms. Self-governance regimes can be established in a single region of a state, such as in Crimea or Bougainville. It is also possible that multiple such regions are established, such as in the United Kingdom. The British example also illustrates that the level of powers and number of competences enjoyed by different regions need not be the same—Scotland and Northern Ireland enjoy far greater powers than Wales, for example.14 Finally, it can take the form of a federation in which the boundaries of one or more, and potentially all, units are drawn to reflect specific regional ethnic demographics, such as in Canada, the former Yugoslavia, or the Russian Federation.

There are a number of recent borderline cases, too. Macedonia, under the terms of the 2001 Ohrid Agreement, provides for territorial self-governance extended to local communes in combination with a territorial redistricting exercise that rendered them ethnically more homogeneous. The constitution for Iraq of 2005, while recognizing the existence of the Kurdish region, equally offers other provinces (with the exception of Baghdad) a choice about whether they want to form a region (and thus enjoy significantly greater powers independently of the centre) at some future point. Both the Ahtisaari proposal for Kosovo’s conditional independence and the constitution of Kosovo provide for an arrangement similar to that in Macedonia with local communes as the principle loci of self-government powers while additionally establishing the possibility of horizontal links between them, thus offering Serbs in the north of Kosovo the opportunity to create their own “region.”15

Importantly, while territorial self-governance may be significant, in and of itself it cannot be expected to be sufficient for sustainable conflict settlements in principally two types of situations, which will additionally require power sharing mechanisms.16 If the self-governing territories are ethnically heterogeneous, arrangements have to be made to accommodate this local population diversity. It is important to note here that population diversity as such will only be politically relevant if minorities are sufficiently sizeable. For example, a 5% minority population in a given territorial entity is unlikely to warrant power sharing. In a case with 20% minority population, power sharing is more likely, provided this diversity is attributable to the presence of at least one large group rather than several relatively small ones. This can also be expressed in terms of electoral significance, especially in cases where the majority is split along different part lines and where even small minority parties can act as ‘king-makers’ in voluntary power sharing arrangements.

More generally, power sharing as a result of efforts to accommodate local population diversity in the self-governing territory takes the form of a regional consociation, such as in Brussels, South Tyrol, and Northern Ireland, as well as more recently in the case of Kirkuk.17 If the significance of the territory (or territories) in question relative to the rest of the state is high and necessitates power sharing at the centre, the institutional outcome is a sovereign consociation, such as in Belgium or Switzerland, Iraq or Sudan.18 Regional and sovereign consociations are not mutually exclusive but can occur together, as envisaged, for example, in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement achieved in Sudan in 2005, the Iraqi constitution of 2005, or the Dayton Accords for Bosnia and Herzegovina.19

‘Significance’ as one of the less straightforward, but nonetheless important, key concepts of this analysis needs to be examined in some more detail. For states, territory
possesses certain value in and of itself, including natural resources, the goods and services produced there and the tax revenue generated from them, and military or strategic advantages in terms of natural boundaries, access to the open sea, and control over transport routes and waterways. Additionally, for identity groups, territory very often is also important in a different way – as a crucial component of their identity. Territory is then conceptualised more appropriately as place, bearing significance in relation to the group’s history, collective memories, and ‘character’. Yet, for ethnic groups, too, territory is, or can become, a valuable commodity as it provides resources and a potential power base, including in electoral terms in relation to the state overall if they are sizeable and party-politically united enough to make an electoral impact at the centre. In other words, significance can arise from the size of the local population (of the identity group concerned), the wealth locally generated (as expressed in GDP per capita), natural resource presence, strategic location, and cultural importance. If three or more of these indicators matter, I define significance as ‘high’, for two indicators as ‘medium’ and for one or none as ‘low’. The relevance of a medium level of significance for institutional design outcomes is initially difficult to assess, whereas it is more intuitively logical to hypothesise a particular (non-)outcome in relation to high and low significance. In Figure 1 below, I will therefore operate only with the latter two levels of significance, but return to a discussion of medium-level significance in the empirical analysis.

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, three key characteristics, thus, emerge as crucial in determining institutional design for self-determination conflicts (see Figure 1): the compactness of groups’ settlement patterns in a given state; the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in the territorial entities to which powers and competences of self-governance are to be assigned; and their significance relative to the rest of the state.²⁰
Contemporary Conflict Resolution in Practice: Territorial Self-governance and Power Sharing in Comparative Perspective

The conceptual exploration of the notion of complex power sharing in the previous section established that the details of the institutional accommodation of self-determination claims by territorially compact groups qua territorial self-government are contingent upon two further characteristics of the respective conflict environment: the significance of the territory relative to the rest of the state and this territory’s degree of heterogeneity (ethnic or otherwise). Following the ideal-typical abstraction of institutional design outcomes in Figure 1, the institutions emerging in relevant cases (of territorially compact groups with self-determination claims) should therefore display variably forms of local and central-level power sharing in addition to a form of territorial self-governance and thus regulate both relations within the self-governing territory and between it and the central government. In other words, while one can expect a certain degree of variation in the precise nature of the institutional design in each case, the general premises outlined in the previous section and summarised in Figure 1 should generally hold if the overall assumption is correct that conflict settlements in cases of territorially compact groups with self-determination claims will involve a form of territorial self-governance (federation, autonomy, devolution, and decentralisation) plus local and/or central power sharing depending on the significance of the territory and its population relative to the rest of the state and the degree of the territory’s heterogeneity.

The rest of this section will empirically test these propositions in a number of cases. After a brief discussion on case selection, I establish the basic situational characteristics of each situation. Thereafter, I present data for each case on three questions:

1. Does the conflict settlement involve forms of territorial self-governance?
2. What, if any, is the nature of local power sharing arrangements?
3. What, if any, is the nature of central power sharing arrangements?

Selecting and mapping the cases

I am specifically interested in the institutional design of conflict settlements involving territorially compact groups who make self-determination claims vis-à-vis the state in which they live. By territorially compact groups I mean communities of people who share a sense of identity that is distinct from other communities in the same state, who are neither dominant nor a numerical majority, and who live predominantly in their historic
homeland or an otherwise delineated territory.\footnote{27} Self-determination claims, as the concept is used in this paper, refer to a group’s expressed preference for self-government and can range from demands for independent statehood, unification with another state, territorial self-government within an existing state, and non-territorial self-government (or cultural autonomy\footnote{28}). The former two demands are also referred to as claims for external self-determination, the latter two as claims for internal self-determination.

The total universe of cases along these two criteria is quite considerable: depending on sources, well over 100 cases of territorially compact groups seeking some form of self-determination can be identified.\footnote{29} Of these, I have selected eighteen cases from Europe, Africa and Asia for the following analysis:\footnote{30} Brussels, Walloonia, and Flanders in Belgium; the District of Brčko, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Aceh in Indonesia; the Kurdistan region in Iraq; South Tyrol in Italy; the districts of the Mitrovica region in Kosovo; Albanian-dominated districts in western Macedonia; Gagauzia in Moldova; Bougainville in Papua New Guinea; the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in the Philippines; South Sudan in Sudan); the Crimea in Ukraine; and Northern Ireland and Scotland in the United Kingdom.

Three criteria are particularly important in determining the context of institutional design: the territorial compactness of groups making demands for self-determination,\footnote{31} the heterogeneity of the territories in which they live, and the significance of these territories relative to the rest of the state.

As Table 1 indicates, only three of the eighteen regions (with the relevant qualifications) are not heterogeneous: South Sudan (Sudan), Republika Srpska (BiH), and the Flemish Region (Belgium). With the exception of the Walloon Region (Belgium), all other regions display levels of diversity of at least 5% local minorities.

All but two regions are distinct, and clearly demarcated territories: only the situation in Macedonia and Kosovo is different inasmuch as the settlement areas of ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs, respectively, do not constitute a specific larger territorial entity but comprise relevant local government units only. However, the constitution of Kosovo specifically allows for the establishment of ‘horizontal links’ between local units of self-government, i.e., greater levels of cooperation on matters devolved into the competence of the local communes. This makes it conceivable that Serb-dominated communes can establish their own quasi-region. In contrast to similar provisions in the Iraqi constitution of 2005 (formation of regions from provinces/governorates), in the Kosovo case this does not mean a change in status or powers at the disposal of the quasi-region.

As far as the distinctiveness of the territories in question is concerned, two further observations are noteworthy. First, constitutional reforms in Macedonia following the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, which established the principle of far-reaching decentralisation, went hand in hand with redrawing the boundaries of local communes, thus rendering them more ethnically homogeneous.\footnote{32} Second, two of the territorial entities—Gagauzia and ARMM—are, in fact not territorially contiguous, but rather a patchwork of territories whose populations decided by referendum that they wanted to be part of the respective territorial entity.\footnote{33} In South Tyrol, similarly, the boundaries of the autonomous province were largely determined on the basis of the historical entity of South Tyrol, but some “adjustments” were made to incorporate some predominantly German-speaking municipalities that would have otherwise been part of the province of Trentino.\footnote{34}

Three of the eighteen cases—the Kurdistan Region (Iraq), South Sudan, and Brussels Capital Region (Belgium)—highlight another interesting phenomenon: disputed territories, either between the centre and the self-governing territorial entity (Iraq,
Sudan) or between two self-governing entities (Belgium). These are critical issues for the stability of any settlement, and have potentially significant international implications, as illustrated by the ongoing dispute over Kirkuk. On the other hand, the Brčko Award indicates ways toward the resolution of such disputes.

Table 1: Groups and their corresponding territorial entities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Group/s</th>
<th>Territorial Entity</th>
<th>Heterogeneity</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Dutch-speakers, French-speakers</td>
<td>Brussels Capital Region</td>
<td>85:15</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dutch-speakers</td>
<td>Flemish Region</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French-speakers, German-speakers</td>
<td>Walloon Region</td>
<td>98:2</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Bosniaks, Croats</td>
<td>Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>(60:40)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>Republika Srpska</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks</td>
<td>District of Brčko</td>
<td>49:51 (35)</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Acehnese, Javanese, others</td>
<td>Nanggröe Aceh Darussalam</td>
<td>70:30 (16)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Kurds, Turkoman, Arabs, Assyrians,</td>
<td>Kurdistan Region</td>
<td>95:5</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chaldeans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>German-speakers, Italian-speakers, Ladin-</td>
<td>Province of South Tyrol/Region of Trentino-Südtirol</td>
<td>64:36 (24)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>speakers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Albanians, Serbs</td>
<td>Districts of the Mitrovica Region</td>
<td>88:12 (7)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Macedonians, Albanians</td>
<td>Local districts in western Macedonia</td>
<td>65:35 (25)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Gagauz, Moldovans, Bulgarians, Ukrainians,</td>
<td>Territorial Autonomous Unit of Gagauzia</td>
<td>82:18 (5)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>Bougainvilleans</td>
<td>Province of Bougainville (North Solomons)</td>
<td>Yes51</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Muslims, Catholics, Evangelicals, others</td>
<td>Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao</td>
<td>90:10</td>
<td>Medium53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Southerners</td>
<td>South Sudan (ten states)</td>
<td>No55</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Ukrainians, Russians, Crimean Tatars</td>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td>58:42 (24)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom of</td>
<td>Protestants, Catholics</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>53:47 (43)</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain and Northern</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Scots, British</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>88:12 (7)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Complex Power Sharing in Practice: Institutional Arrangements

As illustrated in Figure 1, the theoretical assumptions that this paper makes are that conflict resolution in cases of territorially compact groups making self-determination claims (1) requires territorial self-government, (2) that ‘internal’ heterogeneity in the thus emerging self-governing territories leads to power sharing arrangements there, and (3) that high significance of the territory relative to the rest of the state results in power sharing at the centre. The data in Table 2 confirm that these assumptions are, by and large, correct.

1. Forms of territorial self-government

With two exceptions, the territories in which the relevant compact groups live have distinct legal status and enjoy legislative and executive powers of their own and do so independently of the central government. The exceptions to this rule are Macedonia and Kosovo where territorial self-government exists only qua decentralisation of power to local communes. While the degree of centralisation is quite substantial, the powers enjoyed by local communes do not include legislative powers. Moreover, strictly speaking, decentralisation in these two cases also means that the relevant groups—ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, ethnic Serbs in Kosovo—cannot fully determine
themselves as distinct population groups in their countries of residence, but only as subgroups in their relevant local communes. This is somewhat mitigated in the Kosovo case, however, where the constitution specifically provides for local communes to cooperate on matters of joint interest in areas in which they do have powers.

Table 2: Institutional Arrangements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-governing Territorial Entity</th>
<th>Heterogeneity</th>
<th>Local Power Sharing</th>
<th>Power Significance</th>
<th>Central Power Sharing</th>
<th>Power Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brussels Capital Region</td>
<td>85:15</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flemish Region</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walloon Region</td>
<td>98:2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>60:40</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republika Srpska</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Brčko</td>
<td>49:51</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Low&lt;sup&gt;69&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanggröe Aceh Darussalam</td>
<td>70:30</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistan Region</td>
<td>95:5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province of South Tyrol/Region of Trentino-Südtirol</td>
<td>64:36</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Districts of the Mitrovica Region</td>
<td>95:5</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local districts in western Macedonia</td>
<td>95:5</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Autonomous Unit of Gagauzia</td>
<td>82:18+political</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province of Bougainville (North Solomons)</td>
<td>Yes (political)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao</td>
<td>90:10</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan (ten states)</td>
<td>Yes (political)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td>58:42</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>53:47</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>88:12</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In all other cases, the specific territories in which the groups reside have legal status as a whole and on their own. This takes different forms:<sup>60</sup>

a) Devolved government (one country, two cases): Scotland, Northern Ireland;
b) Autonomy (seven countries, seven cases): Brčko, Aceh, South Tyrol,<sup>61</sup> Gagauzia,<sup>62</sup> Bougainville, ARMM, Crimea;
c) Federation (four countries, seven cases): Brussels Capital Region, Flemish Region, Walloon Region, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska, Kurdistan Region, South Sudan.

2. Forms of local power sharing

The original assumption of the paper was that ethnic heterogeneity in the self-governing entity leads to the establishment of local institutions that guarantee power sharing between relevant identity groups. The results of the case analysis here are more ambiguous at first sight. Even assuming that heterogeneity is politically relevant only above the level of 10%, there are still several cases that do not confirm this assumption: Aceh, Gagauzia, Crimea, and Scotland. The case of Aceh is the one most difficult to explain, given the relative novelty of the arrangements and lack of data availability. From what little information is available, there are two issues. On the one hand, the majority of the non-Acehnese are migrant Javanese, who are widely seen as privileged representatives of Jakartan domination. Hence a local power sharing arrangement would have given a say to precisely those against whom the Acehnese were rebelling. However, since the settlement, tensions have emerged between the Gayo, the largest ‘native’ non-Acehnese group, and the Acehnese. Here, future instability might have its sources in the lack of local power sharing institutions.<sup>63</sup> In Scotland, during the first two terms of devolved government, the pro-union Labour Party governed first in a majority government of its own and then with the support of the Liberal Democrats in a coalition. The only decisively pro-independence Scottish National Party (SNP) achieved a plurality of votes in the 2007 elections (47 out of 129) and has been governing as a minority government since then. From this perspective, the nature of the party system, at least in
part, explains the lack of a power sharing government: the SNP is the only decidedly pro-independence party, and none of the other major parties (Labour, Liberal Democrats, and Conservatives) was keen to join it in government, but the political-ideological differences between them prevented them from forming an (anti-independence) coalition, even though numerically this would have been possible with the three parties commanding a total of 78 (out of 129) seats in the Scottish parliament. However, indirectly, and because of the balance of power in the parliament, the SNP needs to seek support from the other parties for its legislative programme which guarantees the major parties a certain degree of at least indirect influence on government policy.

In Gagauzia and Crimea, the situation is slightly different. In Crimea, coalition governments including ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians have been the norm rather than the exception in regional politics, even though this has meant that the Crimean Tatar population (12.1% of the Crimean population) has been excluded from executive power. Voluntary power sharing coalitions, in this case at least, thus can have a potentially negative impact on inter-ethnic relations inasmuch as they can become a mechanism of exclusion rather than inclusion. In Gagauzia, on the other hand, the chief executive of the autonomous government is directly elected and appoints his or her own cabinet. This kind of ‘presidential system’ is combined with a single-member plurality election system that has so far always resulted in a regional assembly that has been relatively representative of Gagauzia’s ethnic make-up and has, qua committee scrutiny, checked the powers of the regional governor. All other heterogeneous self-governing entities have guaranteed power sharing mechanisms in place:

- Guaranteed representation in the regional executive: Brussels Capital Region, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brčko, Kurdistan Region, South Tyrol, Bougainville, South Sudan, Northern Ireland;

- Parliamentary decision-making procedures (qualified or concurrent majority voting): Brussels Capital Region, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brčko, Northern Ireland.

3. Forms of central power sharing

In cases of highly significant territories power sharing institutions exist at level of the central government, except in the case of Crimea. Moreover, there are provisions in four cases of medium significance (Kosovo, Gagauzia, Bougainville, and Mindanao), but these arrangements do not amount to power sharing in the sense of consensual decision making between representatives of the self-governing entity and the centre.

In the case of Kosovo, arrangements extend to the guaranteed representation of the Serb and other non-Albanians communities in the government and to concurrent voting procedures on issues of vital interest in parliament. However, while the majority of Serbs lives in the districts of the Mitrovica region, there are other pockets of Serb settlement in central and southern Kosovo, and thus a guarantee of Serb representation and co-decision making does not equate to these guarantees applying to Serb representatives from Mitrovica per se.

In the cases of Gagauzia and Mindanao, representation of the self-governing entities in the central government is achieved qua cooptation. Central-level power sharing, therefore, is somewhat limited in that it only extends to the mandatory inclusion of members of the regional government into the national government. While regional representatives, thus, can participate in the national executive process, they do not have veto powers nor are there qualified or concurrent majority voting procedures in place that would increase the influence of regional representatives at the centre. Hence, the main benefit of these arrangements needs to be seen in both the symbolic recognition of the region (qua inclusion of its representatives into the national government) and in the
establishment of formal channels of communication between regional and central executives (i.e., the institutionalization of a policy coordination mechanism).

The case of Bougainville, local influence on central decisions is generally sought to be achieved through the establishment of consultation mechanisms aimed at establishing consensus between the central and autonomous governments, and by reference to judicial arbitration where such consensus cannot be achieved. Moreover, any changes to the agreed and constitutionally entrenched structure of the institutions created by the 2001 Bougainville peace agreement require the consent of two-thirds of the representatives of Bougainville’s parliament and the Bougainville government has to be represented at its request in any international negotiations potentially affecting the constitutional status and powers of Bougainville as per the 2001 peace agreement.

The situation in another case of medium significance is also of interest in this respect. In South Tyrol, no central-level power sharing arrangements exist, but the settlement for South Tyrol creates technically a nested consociation with guaranteed power sharing at the level of the province (South Tyrol) and the region (Trentino-Südtirol), which is the next higher level of authority, and where South Tyrol is clearly of high, rather than medium significance.

In broader terms, this means that in both low-significance cases no central-level power sharing exists, while for a total of nine cases where the self-governing territory is of high significance, in eight central-level power sharing structures exist. In four out of seven medium significance cases, representation in executive and/or legislative branches of the central government is guaranteed. Where central-level power sharing institutions exist, they take the form of one or both of the following arrangements:

a) Guaranteed representation in the central executive: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Indonesia, Iraq, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Papua New Guinea, Sudan;

b) Parliamentary decision-making procedures (qualified or concurrent majority voting): Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Kosovo, Macedonia, Papua New Guinea.

The relevance of “complex power sharing”

I started with the observation that territorial self-governance is a widely used feature in contemporary (and past) conflict settlements and settlement proposals. I hypothesised that this should be particularly obvious in cases of territorially compact groups making self-determination claims, but that territorial self-governance would be insufficient in cases where the relevant territories are internally heterogeneous, and are highly significant relative to the rest of the state. In these cases, I contended, power sharing arrangements would be necessary at the local and/or central levels as well to come to a conflict settlement.

In a discussion of settlements in 18 individual cases across 13 countries, these assumptions were broadly confirmed. This emerging practice of conflict settlement can be referred to as “complex power sharing” and refers to a practice of conflict settlement that has a form of self-governance regime at its heart, but whose overall institutional design includes a range of further mechanisms for the accommodation of ethnic diversity in divided societies, especially forms of power sharing.

In terms of integrating conflict resolution theory and practice, and thus equip practice with theoretically well-informed menus of feasible options to be applied in a specific case, the primary question is whether complex power sharing settlements, like the ones discussed in this paper, are more than the result of choices of short-term convenience in an effort to achieve a settlement at the negotiation table without considering its implications for long-term sustainability of the governance structures it establishes. There is little point in making immodest claims at this stage about the feasibility of
complex power sharing, as conceptualized and analyzed here, as a conflict resolution strategy equal, if not superior to what existing theories prescribe. The cases examined here are all similar to the extent that they comprise self-determination claims by territorially compact identity groups that lend themselves to the establishment of complex power sharing regimes with territorial self-governance arrangements at their heart. Some of them have proven relatively stable over time (i.e., over ten years): Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Crimea, Gagauzia, Scotland, and South Tyrol. Northern Ireland has, despite significant delays, achieved a remarkable institutional compromise that appears to endure. The settlements for Aceh, Bougainville, Kurdistan Region, Macedonia, Kosovo, and South Sudan are too short-lived to provide reliable data about their long-term stability. Mindanao has only achieved partial success in bringing peace to a troubled region of the Philippines. While the track record may thus be sketchy, the sheer range of cases in which settlements have been achieved that fall into the complex power sharing category, suggests that there is a clear trend of conflict resolution practice that points in the direction of complex power sharing settlements.

References


The essence of complex power sharing is that such institutional frameworks go significantly beyond one-dimensional arrangements offering "just" autonomy, or power sharing, or minority rights bills, or improved economic development, etc., but combine a range of different mechanisms to address the concerns of all relevant parties.  

1. The essence of complex power sharing is that such institutional frameworks go significantly beyond one-dimensional arrangements offering "just" autonomy, or power sharing, or minority rights bills, or improved economic development, etc., but combine a range of different mechanisms to address the concerns of all relevant parties.  

2. Proposals for decentralisation/federalisation also exist in Ethiopia, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo, but in all three cases lack serious implementation efforts. I am grateful to Sandra Joireman and the late Donald Rothchild for providing me with this information.

3. In India, one could include the so-called Union Territories, such as Pondicherry (Puducherry).  

4. The 2003 constitution of the Union of Serbia & Montenegro provided for a bi-national federation between the two entities and included an option for Montenegrin independence after three years if at least 55% of people participating in a referendum would opt for it. The referendum was held on 21 May 2006, and Montenegro declared its independence on 3 June after the country's referendum commission confirmed as official the preliminary result which had already been recognised by all five permanent members of the UN Security Council on 23 May. For the text of the Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, see http://www.legislationline.org/upload/legislations/41/97/29d53b4d7dabbfe0af7023a6454a.htm.

5. This is not meant to be a comprehensive list of cases. For an analysis of some examples and general trends in the spread of territorial self-governance regimes as part of conflict settlements, see contributions in Weller and Wolff (2005).

6. For the full text of this document, see http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_Text.html.

7. For the full text of this document, see http://www.legislationline.org/upload/legislations/41/97/29d53b4d7dabbfe0af7023a6454a.htm.

8. See documentation at http://www.peaceinsrilanka.lk/, a website run by the Secretariat for Co-ordinating the Peace Process set up by the government of Sri Lanka.

9. I borrow the term 'complex power-sharing' from a research project funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York ("Resolving Self-determination Disputes Through Complex Power Sharing Arrangements"). In this project, complex power-sharing regimes are distinguished "in that they no longer depend solely on consociational theory, or solely upon integrative theory", involve international actors that "are often key in designing, or bringing experience to bear upon, the structure of the eventual agreement, or its implementation" and "consider a far broader range of issues ... and ... address structural issues as diverse as economic, civil-military relations and human and minority rights, and ... do so at many different levels of government", thus recognising "that at different levels of government, different strategies may be more, or less, applicable, and consequently more, or less, successful, in engendering peace and stability" (Kettley, Sullivan, Fyfe 2001: 4-5). O’Leary (2005a: 34-5) uses the term 'complex consociation' in a similar manner.


13. For a review of recent writings on power sharing and power dividing, see Wolff (2007b).

14. For a more extensive appraisal of asymmetrical federal systems, see McGarry (2007).


16. Power sharing is a form governance whereby representatives of different groups make decisions jointly in one or more branches of government. Power sharing can occur as a result of guaranteed arrangements, e.g., particular parliamentary election (reserved seats, quotas) and/or government appointment procedures (d'Hondt mechanism, guaranteed posts for members of particular groups) in combination with specific decision making procedures in relevant branches of the government (qualified or concurrent majorities) or emerge as a result of the electoral process as part of coalition formation. I am primarily interested in the former, guaranteed type of power sharing, but will note voluntary power sharing coalitions where appropriate.

17. For an extensive comparison of regional consociations, see Wolff (2004).  

18. Sovereign consociations are, of course, also possible without provisions for territorial self-governance. The key example here is Lebanon, yet Lebanon, too, underlines the importance of self-governance (or segmental/group autonomy), in this case taking the form of non-territorial, or cultural/personal autonomy extending to individuals as a group rather than to individuals living in a specific territory.  


20. A fourth situational characteristic – transnational links – also shapes institutional design in a significant way. Such links are often determined by historical and/or ethnic relations between populations and territories divided by contemporary international boundaries. In a broader sense, transnational links need not be just with
immediately neighbouring countries, but can, as a consequence of past intra-empire migration or emigration, connect population groups across greater distances, too (consider, for example, existing links between Germany and the descendents of ethnic German minorities in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as far as Kazakhstan, or the relations between Hungary and ethnic Hungarian minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans and parts of the former Soviet Union, as well as among those communities and the Hungarian diaspora in the US). In these instances, formal transnational institutions may be established and/or so-called para-diplomatic powers be granted to self-governing territorial entities, and/or minority rights regimes be enacted explicitly for the maintenance of such links. However, there is also another reason why self-governing territorial entities should be invested with para-diplomatic powers: the ability to engage in the international arena is increasingly important for them in order to discharge their ‘other’ powers effectively, for example in relation to economic development and cultural identity maintenance. Thus, the establishment of formal transnational institutions and/or the conferral of para-diplomatic powers to self-governing territorial entities need not happen only in cases in which historic, ethnic or other transnational links necessitate this, but can become a feature of institutional design regardless of the existence of such links. More generally on the potential contribution of para-diplomacy to conflict resolution, see Wolff (2007a).

In the majority of cases, heterogeneity, where it is relevant, is ethnic in nature, but there are also cases where political rivalries within one ethnic group necessitate local power sharing deals, e.g., in Bougainville and in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. The latter, however, also is an example of elements of inter-ethnic power sharing (see below).

Federalism implies a constitutionally entrenched structure in which the entire territory of a given state is divided into separate political units, all of which enjoy certain exclusive executive, legislative and judicial powers independent of the central government. Note that there are common exceptions to this ‘entire-territory’ rule. Capital cities, unless they are federal entities of themselves, often have special status (Washington, D.C., vs. the German capital Berlin which is a Bundesland). Occasionally, there are also other special territories that are directly ruled by the federal government, even though they may enjoy some degree of self-governance (falling short, however, of full federal status), such as the India’s Union Territories.

Autonomy is the legally entrenched power of territorial entities to exercise public policy functions (legislative, executive and judicial) independently of other sources of authority in the state, but subject to the overall legal order of the state and any relevant international obligations. Autonomy normally enjoys similar constitutional protection as federalism, but is distinct in that it does not necessitate territorial sub-divisions across the entire state territory. Autonomy is normally a feature of otherwise unitary states. Cf. also Weller and Wolff (2005).

Devolution is another form of achieving territorial self-governance. Like autonomy, it can be applied to selected territories in an otherwise unitary state. In contrast to autonomous territories, however, the degree of legal protection for entities with devolved powers is usually weaker (in the sense that it is easier to reverse) and often extends only to protection by ‘regular’ rather than constitutional laws.

Decentralisation (guided by the principle of subsidiarity) means the delegation of executive and administrative powers to local levels of government. It is rarely constitutionally entrenched.

As indicated above, transnational dynamics may additionally shape the institutional structure of conflict settlements. While the absence of concrete historical, ethnic or other links between the populations and/or territories for which conflict settlements were adopted does not preclude the establishment of formal institutions or the conferral of para-diplomatic powers on the authorities of self-governing territories, according to the general principle of territoriality, one would expect their power sharing relations to subside in cases where such links are present. For reasons of space, however, I do not investigate this claim further here.

Apart from adding the characteristic of territorially compact settlement, I rely here primarily on the definition by Capotorti (1979) who defines a minority as “... a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the state – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion, or language.”

I accept that this selection of cases includes some notable absences—India (creation of three new states in 2000), Nicaragua (Atlantic North and Atlantic South regions), Mexico (1996 Chiapas Agreement), autonomous subjects of the Russian Federation (such as Tatarstan)—for which no comparable data could be obtained. Also absent are the results of two sets of constitutional reform processes: in Canada (indigenous peoples and Quebec) and Spain (e.g., Catalunya, Basque Country). Finally, I also leave out the case of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, where an “Agreement on the Restructuring of Relations Between Serbia and Montenegro” was achieved under EU mediation in March 2002, but which was never implemented except for holding a referendum on independence in Montenegro which succeeded in 2005.

As noted above, this is the primary selection criterion for the cases discussed.

In the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo greater ethnic homogeneity at various levels of governance (from entity to local commune) is a result of deliberate policies of ethnic cleansing during the wars of Yugoslav disintegration in the 1990s. High levels of separation, partly the result of violence and partly grown of long-term trends in population movement and settlement, can also be observed in Belgium and Northern Ireland.

In Mindanao, an initial referendum took place in 1989 in which four of the eligible twenty-two provinces and cities opted for inclusion into the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). In 2001, a second referendum was held, and one further province and one further city joined the ARMM. In Gagauzia, only one referendum was held in 1995. In both cases, the autonomous entity that emerged as a result of the referenda was territorially non-contiguous.
The second important feature that distinguishes South Tyrol from the other cases here is that it was not
an entity in its own right under the provisions of the 1948 and 1971 autonomy statutes, but rather was
joined with the province of Trento into a region and derives its autonomous status principally from the devolution of
powers from the region to the province. The revised 2001 autonomy statute constitutes the two provinces as
two entities in their own right, even though they remain formally part of the region of Trenton-South Tyrol.

This is calculated as the ratio between the largest group and the total of all other groups. If local minorities
make up more than 10% of the total, the share of the largest local minority group is indicated in parentheses.
I do not examine here the extent to which heterogeneity is a result of recent, state-sponsored immigration.

As noted earlier, significance can arise from size, population density, natural resource availability, strategic
location, and cultural importance. If more than three of these indicators matter, I define significance as ‘high’,
for two indicators as ‘medium’ and for one or none as ‘low’.

Of the 1 million Belgian citizens resident in Brussels, 85% are French-speaking, 15% Dutch-speaking.
The bilingual Capital Region of Brussels only came into being as a fully self-governing region in 1989,
consisting of 19 communes with a majority of French-speaking citizens. While this constituted major progress
compared to the situation since the 1960s, plans to redraw the region’s boundaries have been part and parcel
of a broader constitutional crisis engulfing Belgium at the end of 2007.

The province of Flanders contains 58% of Belgium’s population (6.1 million people), and is, bar six
municipalities with facilities for French-speakers along the border with the Walloon Region and another six such
municipalities in the so-called Eastern Rim of Brussels, exclusively populated by Dutch-speakers. The total
French-speaking population of these 12 municipalities is below 80,000 or less than 1.5% of the total population
of the Flemish Region.

The Walloon Region contains 32% of Belgium’s population (3.4 million people). Of these, approximately
70,000 are German-speakers, concentrated in nine eastern municipalities along the German border. There are
also four municipalities with facilities for Dutch-speakers along the language border.

There has been no census in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1991, when the following data were established:
total population—4.38 million, Muslims—1.9 million (43.5%), Serbs—1.37 million (31.2%), Croats—761,000
(17.4%). Current population estimates set the total resident population at 3.84 million. See

The current estimate of the total population of Kosovo is 1.9 million of which a total of 228,000 (12%) are
Greek Turks. See http://www.stat.gov.mk/pdf/kniga_13.pdf. Other estimates commonly assume a total population of around 5-6 million. All estimates agree that the overall population of the Kurdish Region in Iraq 95% are Kurds, the rest Assyrians, Chaldeans, Turkmen, Armenians and Arabs.

As with the overall population for Bosnia and Herzegovina, no recent census data are available. An estimate
for 1999 was 49% Serb, 35% Bosniak and 15% Croat. Since then, the number of Bosniaks has probably
increased and that of Serbs somewhat decreased. I am grateful to Florian Bieber for providing this information.

According to data of 2003, Aceh’s total population of an estimated 3.93 million consisted of several ethnic
groups of which the Acehnese were the largest with approximately 70%, followed by Javanese (16%). A
census was apparently conducted in 2005 with support from the UNFPA, but no data could be found. See

There are only estimates of the current population of Kurdistan. UNDP data of 2004 project the population
size of the three governorates of Dohuk, Suleimaniya, and Erbil at 3,579,916. See
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2005.nsf/FilesByRWDocUNIDFileName/KHII-5CC44A-undp-rrc-
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Mindanao as a whole comprises 18.1 million people (24% of the total population of the Philippines). The ARMM’s population is 2.8 million (15.5% of the population of Mindanao), and of these, 90.1% were Muslims (compared to a total of 20.4% in Mindanao as a whole). The largest ethnic group in the ARMM (Maranao), in contrast, made up only 26.4% of the total population. See http://www.census.gov.ph/data/sectordata/ar05173tx.html.

Mindanao is ranked as of medium importance because of it wealth in natural resources and its strategic importance for the Philippines’ dormant-but-not-abandoned claim to Sabah, which is dependent upon its claim to Sulu in Mindanao. My thanks to Graham Brown who provided this information.

The states of Abyei, Nuba Mountains, and Blue Nile are currently disputed territories between north and south. They are to hold a referendum in 2011 on whether to join South Sudan, which will at the same time decide upon its independence or continued membership in Sudan.

The term ‘Southerners’ in Sudan is an umbrella term for various predominantly non-Arab tribes and communities, including Dinka and Nuer as the two largest groups. Divisions among them are linguistic (the two official languages are English and Juba Arabic, with a variety of officially recognised regional languages). The Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) has been the sole political (and military) representative of the South since its merger with the South Sudan Defence Force in January 2006.

Russians are the largest ethnic group in Crimea (58.32% of the total population), followed by Ukrainians (24.31%) and Crimean Tatars (12.1%). See http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/regions/reg_crym/.

‘Protestants’ and ‘Catholics’ are the most common, historically determined markers for the two population groups in Northern Ireland, indicating both religious affiliations and sense of national belonging. The conflict as such, however, is not a religious one, but rather one in which one population group seeks continued membership of the region in the United Kingdom, while the other strives for unification with the Republic of Ireland. Cf. McGarry and O’Leary (2004), Wolff (2001, 2003). The 2001 census data establish the distribution of the two communities in the total population in Northern Ireland at 43.76% Catholics and 53.13% Protestants. See http://www.nisranew.nisra.gov.uk/census/Census2001Output/KeyStatistics/keystats.html.

The 2001 census data put the percentage of the population declaring their primary ethnic group identity as White Scottish at 88.09% and as Other White British at 7.38%. See http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2004/02/18876/32939.

Note that low significance refers explicitly to the state as a whole. The two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina—the Federation and Republika Srpska—disputed control over Brčko for several years and finally agreed to an international arbitration placing the district into ‘condominium’ between them.

I am only discussing legal status here, not the substance of actual powers enjoyed by the entities.

Constitutional reforms towards federalisation have been under way in Italy since 2001. Once complete, the status of the province of South Tyrol will still be that of an autonomous entity, but that of the region of Trentino-Südtirol would be that of a federal entity.

It is conceivable, but unlikely, that Moldova will become a federation in the process of resolving the conflict with Transnistria. In this case, Gagauzia might either retain its autonomous status (within the Moldovan federal entity) or become a federal entity of its own, alongside a Moldovan and Transnistrian entity.

I am grateful to Graham Brown for sharing his insights into the case of Aceh with me.

After the 2008 local elections, a serious deadlock between communists and non-communists prevented the Assembly from functioning for several months. Following mediation by the EU Special Representative for Moldova, a formal power sharing arrangement, involving the rotation of Assembly Chairperson, his/her Deputies, and Committee Chairs was suggested and initially agreed to be the local parties, but vetoed by the Moldovan president. At an assembly session on 31 July, the local parties nonetheless agreed to a power sharing deal giving the Presidency of the Assembly to a non-communist, and splitting the two deputy positions and eight committee chairs equally between communists and non-communists.

The draft constitution of the Kurdistan Region states in Article 111: “A fair representation of the Minorities should be represented in the formation of the Kurdistan Region’s Council of Ministers.” Document in author’s possession.

The regional constitution of Bougainville determines mandatory inclusion of representatives of Bougainville’s three regions into the regional government.

Local power sharing here extends to a 60:40 quota representation at the level of South Sudan and all its ten constituent states for representatives of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) and the government in Khartoum.